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INTRODUCTION
Recently the trend of the law towards involvement in
. the area of mental retardation has resulted in the courts'
evaluating and specifying treatment for the mentally retarded.
In a landmark case, Wyatt v. Stickney, 1 establishing judicial review of the question of adequacy of treatment, Judge
Johnson said:
Adequate and effective treatment is constitutionally
required because, absent treatment, the hospital is
transformed "into a penitentiary where one could be
held indefinitely for no convicted offense •.. The
purpose of involuntary hospitalization for treatment
purposes is treatment and not mere custodial care
or punishrnent ... In the context of the right to
appropriate care ... no viable distinction can be made
between the mentally ill and the mentally retarded.
Persons committed to mental health facilities shall
be afforded adequate treatment.LEmphasis added..=/
"Shall" is a strong word, rarely used in psychological
literature but frequently in the law.
1

It is difficult to

325 F.Supp. 781 (M.D. Ala. N.D. 1971} quoting from
Ragsdale v. Overholser, 108 U.S. App. D.C. 308, 281 F.2d 943,
950 (1960) .
(Wyatt was the first case to hold that both the
mentally ill and the mentally retarded were entitled to adequate treatment. A mentally retarded patient':s right to due
process and equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment
to the U.S. Constitution is violated when the state confines
a patient on the "altruistic theory" that he must receive
treatment and then fails to provide it.}

2

determine to what extent "shalls" can be legislated or
judicially determined where human conditions are involved.
Judge David Bazelon, author of an early court decision
ruling that the mentally disabled have a right to treatment,

2

calls for an interdisciplinary approach to the problem of
appropriate treatment. 3

Professionals in the field of z:etara-

a~i~n~--attorneys,4 legislators, judges, psychologists, soc+
ial workers and those in special education--are concerned
with the relationship between new concepts in the area of
mental retardation and the current legal controversies.
2

Rouse v. Cameron, 373 F.2d 451 (D.C. Cir. 1967)
(Failure of a state mental health facility to provide treatment to a person involuntarily committed was contrary to the
requirements of the 1964 Hospitalization of the Mentally Ill
Act, D.C. Code Ann. §21-501 (1966) mandating treatment for
"persons hospitalized in a public hospital for mental illness". His opinion and a concurring opinion by Judge Fahy
suggest that even without this statutory mandate, a person
has a constitutional right to adequate treatment under the
due process and equal protection clauses of the Fourteenth
Amendment of the U.S. Constitution or the prohibition against
cruel and unusual punishment of the Eighth Amendment of the
U.S. Constitution.
3

Bazelon,D., The Mental Disability Law Reporter, 1
(June-July, 1976) I. The Journal is a publication of the
American Bar Association Commission on the Mentally Disabled.
It reviews case law, leg,tslati0n and· regulations, and
articles.
It also lists major works on mental disability law
and the activities of the ABA Commission. It is designed for
attorneys and judges as well as all persons working in and
affected by the . mental disability system.
4

The American Bar Association, in establishing the
Commission on the Mentally Disabled, recommended that state
associations follow suit. In 1976 the Oregon Board of Bar
Governors established an Oregon Committee for the Rights of
the Mentally Disabled, which began meeting in January, 1977.

3

Habilitation for the mentally retarded and evaluation of the
effectiveness of the effort, traditionally the domain of
5

psychology, is now an established justiciable

area.

Mental

retardation is a theoretical and practical issue for the law
and psychology, from definition to treatment.
Definitions and classification of the mentally retarded
have developed with legal, medical, educational and psycho.

6

logical facets.

Treatment of the mentally retarded is both

the province of psychologists and of the courts.

Also ade-

quacy or effectiveness of treatment, always a concern of
clinical psychologists and psychological research, is a justiciable question for which the courts are seeking evaluation
measures.

Communication between the two professions as both

consider mental retardation will facilitate the goals of
both--serving the best interests of the mentally retarded
citizen.
5

Justiciable: a controversy appropriate for judicial
review. The right to treatment was first addressed in a
legal position paper by Birnbaum, The Right to Treatment,
American Bar Association Journal, 1960, 46, 499 and has
been recognized in landmark cases, Rousev. Cameron (summarized in note 2) and Wyatt v. Stickney (summarized in note 1).
6

There are considerable problems in the definition and
classification of . mental retardation seen by psychology and
the law . . New trends in psychology are away from classification. The trend in the law is to classify. The problem,
psychologically and legally, of labeling is an issue in
itself, not to be reviewed in this paper but briefly discussed in Chapter III. The interested reader may consult the
growing literature on this subject. See Robinson,N.M. &
Robinson,H.B., The MentallV Retarded Child: A Psychological
Approach. New York: M_cGraw-~i11, 1976.

4

The purpose of this thesis is to review the legal right to
treatment 7 and current theory regarding treatment of the
mentally retarded and discuss implications for mental retardation considering current legal trends and psychological theory.
7Different legal rubrics have been used in several
cases--"protection from harm," "right to treatment" and "need
for care" and right to"normalization and habilitation,"There
have been significant judicial decisions in the field recently. "Habilitatd..on" is a more inclusive term meaning the
process by which the staff of the institution assist the
resident to acquire and maintain those life skills which
enable him to cope more effectively with the demands of his
own person and of his environment and to raise the level of
his physical, mental and social efficiency. Habilitation
includes but is not limited to programs of formal, structured
education and treatment. wiatt v. Stickney, supra, App. A.
In New York State Association for Retarded Children,Inc. v.
Carey, 393 F.Supp. 715, 718(E.D. N.Y. 1975) Judge Judd notes
that the consent judgment reflects the "fact that protection
from harm requires relief more extensive than this court
originally contemplated, because harm can result not only
from neglect but from conditions which cause regression or
which prevent development of an individual's capabilities."
In Donaldson v •.. O'Connor, 493 F.2d 507, 527 (5th Cir. 1974)
vacated 422 u.s. 957 (1975), the court held that "where a
nondangerous patient is involuntarily civilly committed to a
state. mental hospital such a patient has a constitutional
right to such treatment as will help him to be cured or to
improve his mental condition". In Wyatt v. Aderholt, 503
F.2d 1305 (5th Cir. 1974) the court upheld the lower court
rulings that there is a "right to treatment" for civilly
committed mentally retarded persons. It held that persons
in institutions for the mentally handicapped were entitled
to constitutional minimum quality of care and treatment even
if their confinement was justified only b~ the "need for
care." 503 F.2d 1313. See also Welsh v. Likens, 373 F.Supp.
487 CD.Minn, 1974); Davis v. Watkins, 384 F.Supp. 1196
(N, D. Ohio 197 4) •

5

Five :areas at'e covered ;

ll a review· of legal and ps.ychologica,l history, definitions and classifications of

ment~l

retardation;

2) current theory, applications, research and evaluation methods regarding treatment for the mentally retarded;
3} an overview of conunitment and civil rights laws as
they affect habilitation of mentally retarded;
4) the legal right to adequate treatment/habilitation-a review of the constitutional and other legal bases for
treatment, and judicial involvement in evaluating adequacy;
and
5) conclusions, including: a) review of the legal
provisions for treatment in Oregon: b) implications of
judicial and legislative developments and current theory for
Oregon judges, legislatures and mental retardation specialists;
and c) reconunendations.

6

CHAPTER I
HISTORY AND CLASSIFICATION

Throughout recorded history the condition of mental
retardation has persisted.

Society has labeled various

characteristics from simply acting "differently" to I.Q.
scores as evidencing mental retardation.

Similarly,

society's attitudes toward the mentally retarded have also
varied from ostracism, condemnation and even death to parental affection.

Laws and treatment have swung from extremes

of institutionalization to deinstitutionalization for all
retarded.

Vestiges of archaic labels based upon religion

or superstition ·. and remnants of legal precedent which have
not been amended to conform with current theory and research
findings impede the normalization and habilitation of the
mentally retarded.

This chapter examines the history of the

methods in which society, the law, and psychology have dealt
with mental retardation.
The learned Greeks recognized that mental disabilities,
which include both mental illness and mental retardation,
were the result of scientifically explainable conditions

7

rather than evil spirits or demons, but even as recent as
the eighteenth century it was thought demons possessed some
. d s. 8
min

Hippocrates, admittedly centuries ahead of his time,

sought to classify mental infirmities and to provide clean,
comfortable surroundings for persons afflicted with mental
disabilities, 9 thus establishing the protective theory
regarding the disabled.

However Greek city states dealt

very harshly with the mentally retarded sometimes throwing
them off mountains and leaving them to die. 10
The first written law dealing with the mentally disabled was included in the Twelve Tables of Rome, 449 B.C.,
which provided:
If a person is a fool, let his person and his goods
be under the protection of his family, or his parental relatives, if he is not under the care of anyone.11
A person was considered mentally disabled when he did not act
like other people.

The Code of Justinian, 528 A.D. provided

that once a guardian was appointed for the mentally disabled
person, the person was unable to enter into contracts, marry,
Bcoleman,J.C., Abnormal Ps cholo
Glenview, Illinois: Scott, Foresman

and Modern Life.
Co.
4th Ed. 1972.

9Asch,S.H., Mental Disability in Civil Practice,
Rochester,N.Y.: Lawyer's Cooperative Publishing Co., 1973.
lOGearheart,B.R. & Litton,F.w.; The Trainable Retarded.
St. Louis: C.V. Mosby Co., 1975.
11
Asch, supra.

8

make a will or be guilty of any crime requiring criminal
12
intent.
The guardian was in control except when the person was lucid, at which time the person was permitted to
control his own affairs.

When the period of lucidity passed,

the guardian was in control once more.

It is not clear how

or by whom "lucidity" was defined.
Early Western European cultures also had laws restricting the rights of the mentally disabled.

The Visigothic

Code of the early Germanic Tribes in 800 A.D. provided:
All persons who from infancy, or indeed from any age
whatever, are insane and remain so without intermission,
cannot testify, or enter into a contract, and if they
should do so, it will have no validity. But such as
have lucid intervals, shall not be prohibited from
business transactions during those periods.14
During this historical period many mentally retarded were
kept as fools or jesters for entertainment of the elite of
Rome and the Germanic Tribes.

Some were given special treat-

.

ment in the belief that they had some connection with God.15

13 Kanner,L., History of the Care and Study of the

Mentally Retarded.
1964.

Springfield, Illinois: Charles

14Asch, supra.
15 Gearheart & Litton, supra.

c.

Thomas,

9

Thirteenth Century English law contained prohibitions
similar to those of the Germanic Tribes and developed two
categories of the mentally disabled: 1) lunatic--a

person

who .. hat.h understanding but .•• hath lost the use of his person"
as a result of a divine visitation and 2) idiot--a person who
1116
"hth
· ·
a
no un d erstand"ing f rom h"is nativity.
In early English common law, upon a petition being
filed, a jury could find the person a lunatic or an idiot.
In either case, the King was given control over the person
and his property.

However since "lunatics" had periods of

lucidity the King had to account to the "lunatic'' for money
received from his property during those times · when he was
lucid.

As a result of this difference the jury almost ·

always found the person to be a lunatic so that there was
at least a chance that the King's control would not be complete.17In England and elsewhere Protestants lead by Luther
and Calvin abandoned the earlier theroy that the mentally
retarded had some connection with God and declared them
Godless. and possessed by demons. 18
16

statute de Praerogative Regis, as quoted in Asch,

supra.
17 Brackel,S.J. & Rock,R.S., The Mentally Disabled and
the Law, (Revised ed.). Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
19 /I.

18 Gear h eart & Litton,
.
supra.

10
The practice of labeling the mentally disabled was expanded in Seventeenth Century England where the courts established four categories of mentally disabled persons: l)idiot,
or natural fool, 2) a person of good mind who by visitation
of God lost it, 3) lunatics who.

were sometimes lucid and

sometimes non compos mentis (totally disabled), and 4) those
few like the drunkard who deprived themselves by their own
volition. 19
Early English common law required that the mentally
disabled could not be guilty of a crime requiring criminal
intent because he could not form the necessary criminal intent.

In M'Naughten's case 20

Daniel M'Naughten was found

not guilty of the murder of Sir Robert Peel's secretary
(M'Naughten wished to murder Sir Robert) because he was
laboring under such a defective reason, from disease
of the mind, as not to know the nature and quality of
the act he was doing, or if he did kn~y it that he did
not know what he was doing was wrong.
When found not guilty by reason of insanity, the mentally
disabled often incurred a longer period of confinement and
greater stigma than when convicted and incarcerated in::.jail
instead of a mental institution.
19Beverely's Case, as discussed in Asch, supra.
2010 Clark & Fin. 200, 8 Eng. Rep. 718 (1843).
21 Id. The current Oregon law on the so-called "insanity
defense" is found in ORS 161.295 and is discussed in Chapter
III.

11
In the United States laws in general were originally
enacted to deal with property and contracts.

Only later were

society and · then · individual· :.rights included.

And only very

recently have minority rights been included.

Laws regarding

the disabled were originally to deal with the disabled's
property and to protect society by institutionalizing the
disabled.

In 1667, for example, Massachusetts passed a

statute giving town selectmen, similar to our city commissioners, authority to take steps to insure that violently
distrubed individuals did not "damnify others 11 • 22

In

Pennsylvania in 1751 Benjamin Franklin successfully petitioned the Pennsylvania Assemply for the establishment of a hospital which would accept mentally ill patients along with
those suffering physical ailments.

In Williamsburg, Virginia

in 1773 the first hospital solely for the mentally ill was
established, and the second one established in Lexington,
Kentucky in 1824. 23

In 1788 New York enacted a statute per-

mitting constables to lock up the "furiously mad and dangerous" unless they . were in the control of friends or relatives.
22

Asch, supra.

12
[T]here are sometimes persons, who by lunacy, or
otherwise are furiously madd [sic] or are so far
disordered in their senses that t~ly may be dangerous to be permitted to go abroad.
In 1848 the first institutions exclusively for the
education and care of the mentally retarded were established
in Massachusetts. 25

Between 1850 and 1860 institutions for

the mentally retarded were established in New York, Ohio,
Connecticut, and Kentucky. 26

In 1890 there were 14 institu~

tions for the mentally retarded in the United States; by 1910
there were 26 and by 19_23 the number had increased to 40.

27

In the latter nineteenth century the mentally retarded were
the "villains of society" and the "mother of crime, pauperism
and degene~acy,• 28 and as a consequence more and more mentally
retarded were removed from society and placed in institutions.
Institutional growth paralleled society's fears of the mentally retarded.
24 chapt. 31, New York Laws of 1788.
25Gearheari & Litton, supra.

27 Rothman,D., in Kindred,M., Cohen,J., Penrod,D. &
Shaffer,T. (eds.) The Mentally Retarded Citizen and the
Law. sponsored by the President's Committee on Mental
Retardation, New York: The Free Press, 1976.
28 Gear h eart & Litton,
.
supra.

13
The early twentieth century displaced the nineteenth

century emphasis

on institutions with an emphasis on special

education--f irst in special schools and then in the public
schools.

New York, Cleveland, and Providence, Rhode Island

were the first to establish special education classes for the
mentally retarded within the - public schools.

The number of

mentally retarded in the public schools increased from
8,000 in 1910 to 770,000 in 1975 although only about 50% of
the retarded children are now given assistance in special
classes. 29
The 1950's and 1960's were eras of legislation and
national support for the mentally retarded, including legislation enacted to provide for special education for handicapped children. 30

Legislation and support were in part the

result of efforts by President John F. Kennedy and the
National Association for Retarded Citizens.

The support for

the mentally retarded in the 1950 1 s and l960's has also been
ascribed to 1) thorough disgust with the Nazi practice of
ex.termination of retarded persons, 2) .growing interest in
29 Id.
In 1970 the U.S. Bureau of Education for the
Handicapped estimated the number of retarded children as
1,360,737 compared with 707,737 in special education classes.
Bureau of Education for the Handicapped, Annual Reports FY
1968 and FY 1969. Washington, D.C., 4. Approximately 25%
had no special education. The remainder used a variety of
methods. However, the trend is away from special education
and toward mainstreaming, discussed in Chapter II.

14

mental retardation by biological and social scientists, 3}
renewed interest that little was being done for the handicapped, and 4} a well organized parent movement.

31

The 1970's thus far have been an era of normalization
and litigation.

Normalization, a psychological principle

discussed in Chapter II, had its beginnings in the
Scandinavian countries3 2 and has been promoted by Wolfensberger in the United States and Canada.

The principle dir-

ects society to provide services and facilities that permit
the individaul to function in a manner that is as culturally
normal as possible and implies: l} community level services
for the mentally retarded, 2} educational and training programs integrated with "normal" individuals, 3} residential
facilities in small units resembling homes, and 4} daily
contact with normal adults and the opposite sex, and work
alongside the non-retarded.33
To implement normalization and secure other rights for
the mentally retarded, the 1970's have witnessed a proliferation of litigation essentially concerned with the provision
31Kott,M.G., The History of Mental Retardation, in
Rothstein,J.H. (eds.}, Mental Retardation: Readings and
Resources. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc., 1971;
Saras on, s. B. & Doris, J. , Psycholog:ic·a:1 Problems.:'. in Mental
Deficiency. New York: Harper & Row, 1969.
32wolfensberger,W., Normalization: The Principle of
Normalization in Human Services. Toronto: National Institute
on Mental Retardation, 1972.
33Gearheart & Litton, supra.

15

of appropriate education and/or training in the public
schools, 2) adequate care, protection from harm, and appropriate training within institutional settings and 3) just and
proper compensation for labor. 34

The decisions by the courts

have held that 1) the mentally retarded and all other handicapped

chil~ ren

have a right of free access to public educa-

tion, 2) inJ titutionalized mentally retarded have a right to
receive treatment that will lead to habilitation rather than
deterioration, 3) proceedings for commitment or other
infringements upon the liberty of the mentally retarded be
conducted fairly and if restrictions are imposed they be the
l~ast

restrictive alternative, and 4) the mentally retarded

forced to labor against their will at least be given adequate
compensation for all non-therapeutic work~ 35
LEGAL TERMINOLOGY

Varying terminology from law, medicine, and psychology
has clouded communication among professionals--all concerned
with mental retardation.
The lawyer came first; it was he, and not the physician
who had to manage the consequences of mental disease
insofar as they affected the interests of the community. The lawyer was then the first to see to it
that the psychotic disturber of the peace be taken

16
out of. circulation, that the homj.cidal maniac (or
cr;iminal i.nsane} be ;r:;-emoved !rom the community and
isolated somewhere,: that p;roperty · mismanaged · and
abandoned by a person mentally deranged be taken care
of in some legitimate way. In other works, all the
problems which .have preoccupied psychiatry ever since
it was born existed to the full extent of their
urgency before it was born, Attempts at their
practical solutions were made, precedents established,
traditions developed, without benefit of any scien' tific clinical psychopathology; the very possibility
of the development of such ~~ychopathology could not
be fathomed for many years,
·
The law categorizes a person under a specific terminology,
and determines his rights accordingly.

This practice has

been criticized, since much of the terminology is inappropriate or anachronistic, but the categorization process is
· d in
. most s t ates. 3 7
s t 1. 11 ut1· 1 1ze
The following are some of the terms and definitions
used by the courts and definitive case references: 1) dotage-feebleness of the faculties caused by old age; 38 2) feeble
mindedness--incomplete development of the mind viewed from
a socio-legal standpoint, not necessarily permanent; 39
36 zilboorg, Legal Aspects of Psychiatry, in Zilboorg &
Itall (eds.) Oge Hundred Years of American Psychiatry. New
York: Harco~rt Brace, 1944.
37Kindred, Cohen, Penrod & Shaffer, supra.
38 Anders·o n v. State, 54 Ariz. 387, 96 P.2d 281 (1939).
39 Re Masters, 216 Minn. 553, 13 N.W. 2d 487 (1944).

17
3) idiocy.-·-an absence of all mind or reason from birth; 40
4} imbecility--menta,l weakness which may not amount to
incompetency;41 5) lunacy--a mind directed by will but misguided by judgment; 42 6) monomani.a--insane on a particular
subject, sane on others;43 7) moral insanity--inability to
distinguish from right or wrong; 44 8} . non· ·comp·o s mentis-total and positive incompetency·. 45
Often different labels are used in different legal
contexts.

To determine the existence of a mental disability,

Oregon, for example, uses: l} "mental illness" and "mental
deficiency .. in discussing civil commitment; 2) "competency"
in discussing appointment of a conservator or guardian,
criminal responsibility and ability to stand trial, ability
to enter into contracts, ability to execute a will and ability
to obtain a driver's license or testify at a trial; and 3)
"mentally handicapped" in discussing education and discrimination in employment and housing.
A

difficulty arises from the use of the same label in

40 Jo:nes v. Commo:nwealth, 154 Ky. 152, 159 s.w. 568 (1915)
41
..
. s1·a u·g hter v. Heath,. 127 Ga. 474, 57 S.E. 69 (1911).
4 2rn re Vanauken, 1 O N • J. Eq • 18 6 (18 5 4) •
43
state v. John, 30 N.C. 330 (1905).
44state v. Levelle, 34 s.c. 120, 13 S.E. 319 (1906).
45
..
..
Greenwade v. Greenwade, 43 Md. 313 (1875).
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different legal contexts:

The same term :may be used in different parts of codes
or statute~, everi though ~ach of these parts may be
designed to accomplish a different result and may be
intended to apply to a different class of persons.
For example, identical terms are often used to
describe persons subject to involuntary hospitalization, and those incapable of caring for themselves.
In fact, the law of these areas applies to a different
mental condition; hence, i t is possible to be "me.ntally
ill" for the purpose of involuntary hospitalization
but to have a~ th7 same .time s~~ficient capacity to
execute a valid .will or marry.
In the case of civil commitment the person must be
mentally deficient and in need of care, custody or training.
"Mentally deficient" is not defined.

Based upon the dual

requirement of mental deficiency and a need for care, custody and treatment before commitment, it would seem that mental deficiency is viewed by the law as embodying something
other than a need for care, custody or training.

Statutes

relating to the appointment of a guardian or conservator define an "incapacitated person" as one "who is unable, without
assistance to properly manage or take care of himself or his
personal affairs. 1147

This may offer courts some statutory

guidance in determining whether or not a person is mentally
deficient, but the decision is ultimately a matter of judicial
discretion based upon the testimony of psychologists and
psychiatrists who have tested and examined the individual.
46Brackel & Rock, supra.
47oRS 126.003(4).
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PUBLIC

AND ~ PRIVATE

ORGANIZATIONS

Both public and private organizations have had a
tremendous impact upon the research, education, legislation
and litigation concerning the mentally retarded.

Through-

out the years a number of these groups have made significant
contributions.

The most influential groups are as follows:

1) American Association on Mental Deficiency, founded
in 1876 as a largely professional group, has been :engaged in
research in the prevention of retardation,_ educational programming, various residential service

mod~ls

and the estab-

lishment of standards and procedures for use with the
tally retarded.

Their standards

includ~.:

men~

a) Standards for

State Residential Institutions, b) Manual on Terminology and
Classification in Mental Retardation, and c) AAMD Adaptive
Behavior Scale.
07,f~.c,i,,encx.

It publishes the American 'J ournal of Mental

(ind Mental Reta·r aati·o n _bi-monthly.

2) National Association for Retarded Citizens, founded
in 1950, is highly involved in initiating classes and :prograrns
for retarded children and youth and litigation.

It is one of

the sponsors of the National Center for Law and the Handicapped.
NARC has also performed evaluations of certain_ govEJrnrnental
services

d~aling . with

the mentally retarded.

It has profes-

sional members r _b ut it is primarily a . group composed of i:arents
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of the mentally retarded,

3) United Cerebral J;>alsy Associations, Inc., founded in
1949, is concerned with legislation and education for all
handicapped.

It has been instrumental in supporting federal

legislation in this area: and has pursued research on causes
of mental retardation, expending approximately one million
dollars per year for research.
4) President•s Committee on Mental Retardation, founded
in 1966, was initially charged to evaluate all federal efforts
in the area of mental retardation and devise new ways to combat the problem.

In its first year the committee outlined

ten top priority areas:
a) availability of mental retardation services to more
of the nation's people;
b) more effective and extensive manpower recruitment
and training programs for work with the mentally retarded;
c) fuller use of existing resources;
d) more public-private partnerships in program development, services, and research;
e) development of a national mental retardation information and resource center;
f) continuing encouragement of basic research, training in application of research, and rapid translation of
research results into service program uses;
g) immediate, major attention to early identification
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and treatment o! the mentally retarded;
hl the special needs

o~

the' mentally retarded taken

into account by social and institutional planning for the
coming decades;
i) clarification of the legal status of the mentally
retarded individual guaranties of rights; and
j} imaginative ideas and approaches that will make new

advances possible by everyone interested in helping the
mentally retarded and combating retardation. 48
The President's Committee has sponsored publication of
articles and books explaining the importance of deinstitutionalization and normalization, e.g. The Mentally Retarded
Citizen and the Law and Cha'n·g:ing Patterns· i ·n· Resiae·ntial
Services for the Menta"lly Retarded.

It has had considerable

impact on the federal legislation dealing with habilitation
also.
PSYCHOLOGICAL TERMINOLOGY
Despite the efforts of the above groups, the law has
yet to rid itself of many archaic and invalid legal definitions for mental retardation.

While there is in psychology

no single universally accepted definition of mental retardation, there is general agreement that diagnosis of mental
48Gear h eart & Litton,
.
supra.
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retardation should be based upon at least three criteria:
1) measured intelligence, 2} adaptive behavior level and 3)
medical classification based on physical infirmities and
49
. b'·
d isa
i l i' t 'ies.

The definition deve.loped by the American

Association on Mental Deficiency is widely accepted:
mental retardation refers to significantly . subaverage general intellectual frinctioning existing
concurr7ntly with ~eficits in adaptive beha~ior~
and manifested during the developmental period.~o
Intellectual functioning is measured by an individual
standardized test of intelligence and performance, and adaptive behavior by how well the person meets the standards of
his age and cultural group. 51

The ranges of retardation

based on these two standards have been labeled for
49 Roos,P.,Basic Facts About Mental Retardation, in
Ennis, B. & Freidman (eds.) 1. Legal Rights o·f the Mentally
Handicapped. New York: Practicing Law Institute, 17, 1973.
50Manual on Terminology and Classi fication in Mental
Retardation, 5 American Association on Mental Deficiency,
Special Publication Service No. 2, Grossman,H.(ed.), 1973.
The Dia nostic and Statistical Manual· for Mental Disorders.
2nd ed. Washington, D.C.: American Psychiatric Association,
1968, defines mental retardatation as "subnormal general intellectual functioning which originates during the developmental
period and is associated with impairment of either learning
and social adjustment or maturation or both." p. 14.
51Gearheart & Litton, supra. Available scales include:
Adaptive Behavior Scales, Alpern-Boll Developmental Profile, Blathazar Scales of Adaptive Behavior, Bristol Social
Adjustment Guides, Cain-Levine Social Conpetency Scale, Fairview Behavior Evaluation Battery, Gardner Behavior Chart, Hospital Adjustment Scale, Newman-Doby Measure of Social Competence, Preschool Educational Attainment Record, Progress Assessment Chart of Social Development, Social Competence Rating,
and Vineland Social Maturity Scale, Robinson & Robinson, supra,
359.

AAMD
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descx-;iptive conveni.erice as; ll mildly retarded, 2) moderately

retarded,

3r

severely retarded, and 4) profoundly retarded. 52

Retardation is partially a social classification, nonexistent in a vacuum.

It is a product of interaction between

individual capabilities and social demands, resulting in what
is termed ''deficits in adaptive behavior".

One mentally

retarded person could be reclassified if either his functioning improved or the social demands made upon him changed.
Like mental illness, retardation is a label applied to a very
diverse population.

At least 250 causes of mental retardation

have been identified, resulting in individuals with widely
varying degrees of intellectual and adaptive functioning.
52

National Association for Retarded Children, Facts on
Mental Retardation 5 (1971) • In order to place the categories
in perspective the word descriptions- and corresponding I.Q.
ranges are as follows:
Stanford-Binet
Wechsler
SD-16
SD-15
mild
moderate
severe
profound

52-67
36-51
20-35
below 20

55-69
40-54
25-39
below 25

I.Q. should not be the only diagnostic criterion. The person's
developmental history, academic and vocational achievement,
motor skill, and emotional and social maturity should also be
considered in making evaluations of retardation. ·
In 1970 approximately 3% of the general United State's
population was mentally retarded. Of this mentally retarded
population 89% were classified as mildly retarded, 6% moderate,
3 1/2% severe, and 1 1/2% as profound. National Association
for Retarded Children, supra, p.15, n.l.

24

Mental retardation specialists have been called upon to
testify in court on the definition _o f mental retardation.
An eXample .o f such a ca·se :is· New York State Ass·o ciation for
Retarded Children: and Parisi v. Garey. 53 Parisi was a class
action brought by residents: of the Willowbrook Development
Center on Stanten Island, New York against state administrators controlling the facili_ty and the Governor of New York.
The c.ourt found that the residents had a right to treatment
and after further testimony, .the parties agreed to certain
minimal habilitation standards.

Dr. James D. Clements, a

member of the President's E:olnmittee on Mental Retardation and
past president of the American Association on Mental Deficiency, observed that mental retardation is not a single
behavior:
Individuals with the same medical diagnosis and
same level of measured adaptive behavior may still
differ ·widely as to the pattern of their ability,
the.signs and symptoms tha~ t~ey exhibit and the
variety of other characteristics they demonstrate . 54
53 No. 72 ... c-356?351 (E ..D". N.Y., April . 30, 1975) as
reported in The Mental Disab:ility Law Reporter, 1977, 1(4)
229.
54Id.
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More than

27S~OOO

people are institutionalized in the

nation's publ·ic and private residential facilities for the
mentally retarded, according to the President's Committee on
Mental Retardation.

This number represents less than 4% of

all mentally retarded persons1 the remaining 96% reside in
the community.SS

As a result of efforts by many groups, such

as the National Association for Retarded Citizens and the
President's Committee on Mental Retardation, it is increas-

..

ingly
, accepted that very few of those classified as mentally
re.ded are severely retarded, the majority being mildly or
mod~rately retarded.S6

The concept of custodial care, based

on the presumption that mental retardation is an irrevocable
status (often a self-fulfilling prophecy) , has changed to a
developmental model: the mentally retarded are capable of
growth and learning regardless of their level of retardation
SS

Fact Sheet on Mental Retardation, Multnomah Association for Retarded Citizens, October, 1974.
S6see note S2.
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or age.57
Generally the causes of mental retardation fall within
nine categories following or associated with: 1) infection
such as rubella during the first tremester of pregnancy,
intoxication, carbon monoxide or lead poisoning, 2) trauma,
3) metabolism disorder or poor nutrition, 4) a growth such
as a cyst or tumor or gross postnatal brain disease, 5)
diseases and conditions due to unknown prenatal influence,
6) prematurity, 7) genetic abnormality, 8) major psychiatric
disorder, 9) psycho-social deprivation and 10) unknown or
uncertain causes.58
The autistic child is sometimes included in the broad
category of mentally retarded.

Autism begins in infancy and

is characterized by an inability to relate to others, specific
57 Roos,P., McCann,B. & Patterson,E.G., A Developmental
Model of Mental Retardation, paper presented at 1970 Annual
Convention of National Association for Retarded Children.
"Children who are classified as mentally retarded, although
limited in their potential for advanced academic achievement
can usually be brought by special education to a state of
self-sufficiency as adults. Moderately retarded ... can learn
to take care of their personal needs and perform many useful
tasks in the home or in a sheltered working situation. The
severely retarded ... can learn self-care, and ..• in such areas
as behavior control, self-protection, language development
and physical mobility." National Association for Retarded
Children, Facts on Mental Retardation, p.4, n.l, 1975.
58 Baumeister,A.A., Mental Retardation. Chicago:Aldine
Publishing Co., 1967. The listing is based upon etiology
classifications derived by the American Association of Mentally Disabled and The Di:agn:ostic and Statistical· Manual of
Mental Disorders (2nd ed.), supra.
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language problems, and a concern for maintaining sameness. 5 9
In contrast to the oj;ten warm and affectionate retarded child,
the autistic child displays aloofness and appears cold and
detached.

Behavior therapy has been used effectively with

the autistic--the most widely known the project based at
UCLA.60

Although many of the same procedures are used with

the autistic as with the mentally retarded, autism refers to
a fairly rare syndrome, not included in this paper.
Research is continuing to assist in determining the
causes of mental retardation.

While prenatal care, genetic

counseling, nutrition, and control of toxins such as lead
offer hope for curtailing its pervasiveness, mental retardation will continue to exist.

This paper will not review the

literature on the etiology of retardation,

61

but rather is

concerned with the habilitation or normalization of the mentally retarded and the legal provisions for treatment.
59 coleman, supra.
60Lovaas, O.I. & Koegel,A.L., Behavior Therapy With
Autistic Children, in Yearbook of the National Society for
the Study of Education. Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
1973.
61

The interested reader should
Robinson,H.B., The Mentally Retarded
Approach. New York: McGraw-Hill Book
supra; and Gearheart & Litton, supra

see Robinson,N.M. &
Child: A Psychological
Co., 1976; Baumeister,
for more discussion.
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SUM.MARY

Mental retardation has been recognized for centuries.
Society's attitudes have shifted from ostracism and death to
habilitation and training, seldom seeking association with
the mentally retarded except for purposes of ridi.cule and
entertainment.

At various times in history, an obligation to

the mentally retarded person has been recognized, but perhaps
more strongly to the mentally retarded's family and friends.
In any event, for at least 2500 years laws have been enacted
affecting the rights of the mentally retarded.
Especially in England and the United States, law is
based on precedent.

A statute or judicial ruling once established is difficult to overcome and change. 62 Since laws

dealing with the mentally retarded have been in existence
for approximately 2400 years before formal psychology began,
many of the restrictions imposed upon the mentally retarded
are anachronistic, failing to take into consideration the
potential of the mentally retarded for development and training.

While the law has been aware of diversity of persons

within the classifications of mental retardation by creating
labels for groups perceived as having certain characteristics,
- its labels are often antiquated and are not based on any
62stare d~cis·i's· is the Latin te:i;m .used by courts to .
indicate established · judici~1 : ·preee.dent. In the case of
judicial opinions unless some good cause is shown, a prior
decision may be refined but it will be overruled.
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recognized .tes.ts nor ident.
i f iable behavior
..
.
.
Psychologists are

tendi~g

toward more ·narrow definitions

and spec.i fic classifications :due ·.to the heterogene:i,ty · of those
termed mentally retarded, and have devised tests. for identifying and classifying persons within the group.

Much has

been discovered about the kinds. of activities mentally
retarded people can learn and methods for teaching them.
Mental retardation specialists . generally agree on promotion
of the least restrictive setting and as norinal a life as
possible for the ·retarded.
Increasingly the legal and psychology

profe~sions

are

interacting in courtrooms, legislative and administrative
hearings and in professional publications on the question of
mental retardation and in particular the right of the mentally
retarded person to "treatment" or "habilitation" as used by
attorneys and judges and "normalization" as used by psycholo. gists.
Litigation in the 1960' s . and 1970' s . has g.iven rise .to
the right to treatment discussed in ChapterIV. Habilitation
is the current legal standard in both judicial opinions and
legislation and normalization the principle most used by
psychologists, · In the tallowing chapter the normalization
principle and other psychological concepts are examined.
Chapter III then overviews pres·ent laws. as they affect the
daily rights of the mentally retarded since many present laws
seriously constrain efforts of habilitation.
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CHAPTER II
CURRENT CONCEPTS IN MENTAL RETARDATION
Treatment of mental retardation is affected by attitudes
of society, the law, and medical and psychological understanding, theory and research.

As outlined in Chapter !, . concepts

of mental retardation and the ensuing treatment of the retarded
by society, by the health professions, and under the law, have
undergone dramatic changes.

The fact that the group labeled

retarded is not homogeneous adds to the confusion; definitions
are complex.

63

Important issues before the law (definition

and classification, right to education, right to treatment,
right to monetary reward for services} are being considered,
but it is a new and unsettled area of law.
cussed in Chapter

I~

As will be dis-

there are no significant court decisions

63 h
.
. th'is paper,
.
re f erre d to in
T e speci"f'ic popu 1 ations
those involved in research summarized in this chapter, those
referred to when discussing theories of normalization and a
developmental model, and those considered in legal cases
and legislation, include all those in the DSM II Classification
of mental retardation.

31
on several important issues and conf li.cting decisions on
others.

The predominant concept of the mentally retarded

under the law is as a child-.... to be protected and cared for,
and secondarily to promote his individual growth and rights,
as will be discussed in Chapter III.

Courts and

legislat~res

increasingly seek answers to questions regarding treatment
as well as definition and classification.
In psychological literature there has been a reaction
to the earlier enlargement of the definition of mental
64
retardation.
The trend is to narrow the definition and to
deal with the retarded as individuals with many different
skills, abilities and needs for treatment.

It is important

to restrict generalizations from court cases as well as from
studies to specific groups because the retarded are such a
heterogeneous group.

Laws broadly stated may be as harmful

as studies too broadly generalized.
This chapter examines the archaic models of mental
retardation, some present conditions in treatment facilities,
emerging ideologies, some specific treatment facilities or
applications reflecting the current theories, recent research
dealing with treatment, and methods of evaluating treatment.
64 Robinson & Robinson, supra.
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ARCHAIC MODELS
As seen in Chapter

I,

the

law

has generally espoused

a protective attttude for the mentally retarded.

In practice

society has generally ostracized the mentally retarded except
for amusement purposes.

Treatment which has been provided has

been based on the assumption that the mentally retarded are
le-ss than human.

The mentally retarded have been placed in

five destructive , archaic models which have justified rejec65
tion and exclusion from the mainstream of society.
These
archaic models assure that the mentally retarded will be
isolated from community life and denied access to services
66
. 1 f or f unct1on1ng
.
.
essentia
as a h uman b"
emng.
These five destructive archaic models are: 1) the
mentally retarded are subhuman organisms lacking the needs,
aspirations and sensitivities of other human beings, and are
therefore to be allowed minimal freedom with little or no
regard for their human rights, 2) the mentally

retarded are

a menace to society because of their criminal tendencies and
their propensity to procreate mentally retarded offspring with
65wolfensberger,W.,Normalization, supra.
66 Roos,P., Basic Facts About Mental Retardation in
Ennis & Friedman (eds.), supra.

'··
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similar tendencies thereby justifying their control in prison-

like institutions, 3) the mentally retarded are "suffering"
and are therefore objects of pity to be kept contented and be
protected from themselves and others, · 4} the mentally .
retarded, with I.Q.'s and intellectual abilities comparable
to children, are to be protected and kept "happy'' as some
would treat the eternal child, 5) the mentally retarded are
sick and

therefore in need of hospitalization in clean,

well organized institutions with adequate medical services.
Since there is no known technique for regenerating brain
tissue, their condition is hopeless and "custodial" care
in hospital-like settings is the best that can be done. 67
None of these five models recognize that the mentally
retarded are not sub-human but are fully participating members of the human race68 and are capable of learning and
growth.

The mentally retarded are not a criminal menace, 69

68united Nations General Assembly, Declaration on the
Rights of Mentally Retarded Persons, Twenty-sixth session,
A/RES/2856 (XXVI) 1972.
69 conley,R., The Economic·s of Mental Retardation.
Baltimore: john Hopkins University Press, 1973; Levy,S.,
The Role of Mental Deficiency .in .the Causation of Human
Behavior,· American Jo:u rn:a :i of Men>t:'a l Deficiency, 1954 , · ~, 455.
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and they are only slightly more likely than the non-retarded
to have retarded children. 70

overprotecti.on and dehumaniza-

tion by treating the mentally retarded as objects of pity,
eternal children or hopelessly sick prevents their training
and development,71
These archaic models are destructive and may keep the
mentally retarded in large institutions where they receive
only custodial care or even if living in private institutions,
or with family or friends their potential may not be realized.
PRESENT CONDITIONS
Present conditions in the institutions for the mentally
retarded may be improving, but only slightly.

Not only is

the developmental model either not recognized or not implemented, conditions are often deplorable.

In 1948 the con-

ditions at the Philadelphia State Hospital for Mental Diseases
were described:
I entered buildings swarming with naked humans herded
like cattle and treated with less concern, pervaded by
a fetid odor so heavy, so nauseating, that the stench
seemed to have almost a physical existence of its own.
I saw hundreds of patients lying under leaking roofs,
surrounded by moldly, decaying walls, and sprawling on
rotting floors for want of seats or benches.
70Kaplan,A.R., Genetics, in Wortis,J. (ed.) Mental Retardation: An Annual Review, 57.-62. New York: Grune & Stratton,

1972.

71

Roos, supra.
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••• Many of the attendants, I was told, were
vagrants recruited directly from courts and police
stations where they were reportedly given the choice
of a jail sentence or going on the Byberry [the
hospital] payroll.72
In 1968 a study of several institutions revealed the
following conditions:
In each of the dormitories for the severely retarded
residents there there is what is euphemistically called
a day room or recreational room. The odor in each of
these rooms is over-powering. After a visit to a
day room we had to send our clothes to the dry cleaners
to have the stench removed. The facilities often contribute to the horror. Floors are sometimes wooden
and excretions are rubbed into the cracks, leaving
permanent stench .
.•• The question one might ask is, Is it possible
to prevent these conditions? Although we are convinced that to teach severely retarded to wear clothes
one must invest time and patience, we believe it
possible to do so--given adequate staff. There is one
more requirement. The staff has to be convinced that
residents can be taught to wear clothes, that thev>can be
engaged in purposeful activities, that they can learn
to control their bladders. The staff has to believe
their "boys" and "girls" are human beings who can
learn. Obviously, the money and the additional staff
are vitally important. However, even more important,
is the fundamental belief that each of these residents
is a human being.73
The report of the Joint Special Commission on Belchtown
State School and Monson State Hospital in Massachusetts in
March, 1971 found old, crowded, sparsely furnished buildings
with inoperative fire alarm systems and doors.
72
. Deutsch,A. , The- Shame of the Sta"tes.
Prentice-Hall,1948, 26.

There were

New

J~rs~y:

73 Blatt,B. & Kaplan,F., Christmas in Purgatory--A
Photographic Essay on Mental Retardation. Boston: Allyn &
Bacon, 22, 1966~
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shortages of sanitation supplies and cockroach infestation.
The residents had no privacy, received abusive punishment and
unnecessary and incorrect medication. 74

It has been stated

by those observing many institutions that one is entering the
"land of the living dead" or ''stumbling into a dung hill,
regardless of how it is camaflouged. 1175
EMERGING PRINCIPLES
Inappropriate myths are being replaced by new concepts or
principles which, if implemented by law, hold promise of
releasing institutionalized mentally retarded not only from
squalid conditions in some institutions, but out of the
institutions and of providing appropriate training and education for the non-institutionalized. 7 6

One such principle is

the developmental model which essentially provides that mentally retarded people be viewed developmentally as persons
capable of growth and learning. Programs for ·retarded based on
74 Rice v. Greenblatt, No. 72-469F (M.D. Mass., filed
Feb. 7, 1972, complaint for plaintiff.) See also Offer, C.W.,
Field Report, Psychology Today, 1974, 61 for a general discussion of some current conditions.
75Blatt & Kaplan, supra.
76 Roos, supra.
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a developmental model have as their goals: 1) increasing the
complexity of the individual's control; 2) increasing the
individual's control over his total environment; and 3)
optimizing each person's human qualities. 77 The developmental
model rejects custodial care and cautions against the use of
labels. 78
A second concep:. is normalization.

Wolfensberger, the

ideology's chief spokesperson, has defined "normalization 11
as
utilization of means, which are as culturally normative as possible, in orda::- to establish and/or
maintain personal behaviors and characteristics
which are as culturally normative as possible. 79
Under the normalization model deviation from the normative
must be justified by demonstrating that the deviation is more
· d'ivi'd ua 1 . 80
. t 'ion f or a par t 'icu 1 ar in
success f u 1 than norma 1 iza

An important element of the model is that each person live in
the least restrictive setting and that the least drastic
alternative among equally effective potential programs or
traatment options be utilized.
77 Roos;P., McCann,B. & Patterson,E.G., A Developmental
Model of Mental Retardation, paper presented at the 1970
Annual Convention of NARC.
78

Roos, supra

79~.·

Wolfensberger, Normalization, supra, 28.

80

Roos, P., Parent Organizations, in Wortis,J. {ed.)
Mental Retardation, supra.
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[T]he normalization principle means making available to the mentally retarded patterns qnd conditions
of everyday life which are as close as possible to the
norms and patterns of the mainstream of society.
This principle should be applied to all the retarded,
regardless whether mildly or profoundly retarded, or
whether living in the homes of their parents or in
group homes with other retarded. The principle is
useful in every society, with all age groups, and
adaptable to social changes and individual developments. Consequently, it should serve as a guide for
medical, educational, psychological, social, and
political work in this field and decisions and actions
made according to the principle should turn out more
often right than wrong.Bl
A third concept, deinstitutionalization, is closely
aligned with the element of least restrictive treatment and
82
is similar to normalization albeit more limited in scope.
The deinstitutionalization model views institutions as the
most restrictive and least likely to yield desired results
of all practiced treatment forms.

Residential care and small

group homes in the community are seen as desirable substitutes
to the custodial care provided in institutions.

Outside the

institution there are also opportunities for social learning
and behavioral techniques which have been successful in the
81
Kugel,B. & Wolfensberger,W. (eds.) Changing Patterns
in Residential Services for the Mentally Retarded. Washington,
D.C.: President's Committee on Mental Retardation, 1969, 181.
82 wyatt v. Stickney, supra, 391, n.7. Testimony of
Dr. Phillip Roos, Executive Director for National Association
for Retarded Children.
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.
83
growth and learning of the mentally retarded.
A fourth concept is mainstreaming which has as its
goal implementation of normalization in education by allowing
retarded children to attend classes along with nonretarded
children for all or most of the school day. 84 There are
various plans but all involve specialized help to both pupils
and teachers.

The assumptions underlying the use of main-

streaming include 1) the special classroom is an isolating
experience for retarded children, 2) retarded children are
better able to achieve, both academically and socially when
exposed to models whose achievement in both areas is more
expert than their own; 3) the regular classroom bears a
greater resemblance to the real world, and 4) exposure to
handicapped children helps other children understand and
.accept them. 85
It has been suggested that in order for mainstreaming
to work most effectively labeling must be avoided. 86 In
addition care must be taken to assure that the retarded
83 watson,L.S.,Jr., Behavior Modification of Residents
and Personnel in Institutions for the Mentally Retarded in
Baumeister,A.A. & Butterfield,E. (eds.} Residential Facilities
for the Mentally Retarded. Chicago: Aldine, 1970.
84 Ro b'inson & Ro b"inson, supra.
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child be given equal educational opportunity. 87

Educational

administrators may be reluctant to expend additional funds
to provide proper opportunity for the retarded student when
he is in a classroom with nonretarded children.

It is in

the state's interest financially, however, to furnish.an
appropriate education for the handicapped child.

It is also

its moral obligation to maximize each individual's potential
for happiness and human dignity.

This latter approach

focuses on the true meaning of education: helping the child
adjust to his environment as well as he can. 88
87

"[Many judicial decisions ••• still define equality on
a 'sameness'doctrine, equal resources to 'children whose
needs are unequal.'
Such a philosophy may have been appropriate for a society that was based on family economic production that could absorb those who could not compete equally
in the nation's economic system. Today, however, the
education of a child is a community concern, for if he is not
given skills sufficient for economic participation, then he
will become dependent upon the community." Weibtraub &
Abeson, Appropriate Education for all Handicapped Children:
A Growing Issue, Syracuse Law Review, 1972, 23, 1037, 1055.
88
·
to an
· Comment: Th e Han a·icapped Chi· 1d Has a Right
Appropriate Education, Nebraska Law Review, 1976, 55, 637.
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l\Pl?LICATIONS
There is general agreement among psychologists that
the principle of normalization, which in essence embodies
most aspects of the models delineated above, offers the
greatest opportunity for the mentally retarded person to
achieve his or her optimum development.

It is therefore

helpful to examine how this principle has been implemented
in the actual care of the mentally retarded.

An examination

of the care and treatment of the mentally retarded in Sweden,
Nebraska and Oregon are illustrative of the principle in
actual practice.
Sweden has generally adopted the principle of

normaliza~

tion for its delivery of services for the mentally retarded,

89

and uses mainstreaming and deinstitutionalization to achieve
normalization.

Under its system retarded children are inte-

grated into nonretarded classrooms, the overall class size
is reduced, and a teacher's aid is added to permit individual
instruction while placing the retarded child in a more normal
setting than he would experience in a special class.

A few

students live in boarding school with parents receiving
instruction in how to care for the mentally retarded child at
home and governmental allowances for expenses incurred.
89

Grunwald,K., Sweden, in Kugel & Shearer, supra.
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Moderately and mildly retarded adults generally live in

group horn.es with arp:roximateli six to eight other mentally
retarded adults.

The homes are in a. community setting with

the staff, which is available for continuous advice on
leisure activities and inter-personal relationships, living
elsewhere.
Severely retarded children and those who cannot live
with their own families live in residential homes with a
family.

Parents maintain frequent contacts with their child-

ren and may take the children home for weekends or holidays.
Residential homes, averaging approximately seven mentally
retarded per home are located in the communities.

While

residential homes are more structured than group homes,
residents there generally have their own rooms and take part
in daytime activities of an industrial or occupationaltherapeutic nature in the community.
For severely retarded adults with antisocial behaviors
there are special hospitals with an average of 240 beds.

Only

a small percentage of the mentally retarded reside in the
hospital and usually for only short term care.

The numbers

of mentally retarded in these hospital facilities are being
reduced annually.

The mentally retarded who begin in these

institutions are progressively moved to residential homes
and then to group homes as they are able to do so.
The plan in Sweden is for integration of the mentally
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l;'etarded into the community and development of his or her

independence,

:tt is organized on the princ;iple

ot the small

group being the most effective way ;for the mentally retarded
to achieve normalization.

Those placed in larger institutions

are placed there for a short term with the goal of reducing
restrictions as progress is made,

Progress is followed by

governmental ministries, unassociated with any institutions,
through filed records and reports and visits with the mentally
retarded themselves to insure conformity with the general
principle of normalization. 90
In Nebraska a system has been developed to supplement
the existing state programs with deinstitutionalization as
its goai. 91

The system's primary purpose is to provide a

continuum of services to meet the needs of all retarded citizens in Nebraska.

The services include:

1) Developmental and educational services.

Mentally

retarded who because of age or severity of mental retardation
are unable to participate in mainstream public educational
programs may be enrolled in developmental center programs to

91 Lensin
. k ,B., Encor, Ne b ras k a, in
. Kuge 1 & Searer,
h
supra.
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obtain training in daily living, language, and group interaction according to individual needs.

Included in these

services are the developmental maximation unit, designed to
provide care for the more severely retarded's medical needs
and to provide certain basic skills in intensive training
sessions, and the behavior shaping unit, which seeks to provide intensive developmental services based upon the principles of applied behavior analysis.
2) Vocational Service Centers.

These centers are designed

to provide a wide range of evaluation and training services
in the community.

The mentally retarded are given an evalu-

ation of their employment capability and training to foster
maximum development and growth.

Groups of mentally retarded

persons who have been evaluated may be employed in community
business and industry under a subcontract with the business
or industry.

The retarded worker is thus able to work under

the supervision of a mental health professional and to work
with and model after non-retarded workers in a normal work
setting.

The goal of the program, independent community

employment, is completed by job development and assistance

in obtaining employment.
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3) Residential Services.

Families are encouraged to

have their mentally retarded child remain at home.

When this

is not possible a child may be placed in a long term setting
with a family.

Some children between the ages of three and

15 may live with up to five other retarded children in a
duplex or apartment in an established neighborhood with
surrogate parents.

The children assist in performing routine

household tasks similar to actual family settings, such as
house cleaning and laundry.

Some children who are more

severly retarded and thus unable to function in a familytype setting may be placed in a developmental maximation or
behavior shaping unit described in (1) above.

The most

structured residence for children has special programs
available.

Placement of these children may have been initi-

ated by the courts, but the long term placement goal is in
less restrictive and more normalized settings as soon as
possible.
Adults may live in an adult training residence where
they may develop close relationships with a small group of
friends or in an adult family living home in which the
mentally retarded lives with up to two other mentally retarded
adults and a non-retarded family.

In both of these the adult

is integrated into the community as normally as possible
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Oregon offers a variety of services to the mentally
retarded althou9h the emphasis is on education.

The normal-

ization principle is espoused, but more work is required to
93
achieve this goal.
A brief review of the types of services
provided include:
1) Preschool programs.

These are individual programs

focusing on physical, intellectual, emotional, and social
development at an early age.

Many programs include parent

training, infant stimulation in the home and preparation for
transition into public school.
2) Trainable mentally

94

retarded classrooms.

For children

who are too retarded to be classified as educable mentally
retarded, programs are provided which emphasize development
in communication, social, motor-physical, quantitative, practical, and community living skills.

Parents are trained to

teach certain skills to their children in the home so that
the education process is not limited to the school setting.
3) Student progress records.

These standardized tests

are given to mentally retarded in educational programs twice

93 Gearheart & Litton, supra, 219,
94 Directory of Programs and Services: Developmental
Disabilities. Portland, Oregon: United Cerebral Palsy, Inc.,

1977.
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a year to provide a standardized means for collecting student

performance data and to provide a tool for evaluating the
programs offered.

Nineteen skill areas are tested.

4) Work activity centers.

These nonresidential centers

are available for the mentally retarded who are unable to
participate in a sheltered workshop.

Productivity is of less

importance than the therapeutic aspects of the work.95
5) Sheltered workshop programs.

These generally

private programs provide the mentally retarded and other disabled persons with opportunities for improving job performance and increasing work productivity while manufacturing and
marketing a product for consumer use.9 6
6) Group homes.

These facilities are located in the

community and vary in size.

They offer a variety of programs

including education, crafts, recreation, occupational training, speech therapy and activity centers. 97
95

Gearheart & Litton, supra. Portland Habilitation
Center, in addition to specific job training in food handling,
custodial, and warehousing also provides work adjustment training, personal adjustment and an activity center. Directory of
Programs, supra.
96

Goodwill Industries is an example of such a sheltered
workshop program in which the mentally and physically disabled
repair donated household itmes for resale at its own outlets.
97
On June 22, 1977, the appldtation of St.Vincent de
Paul Rehabilitation Service of Oregon, !nc., was granted an
application to construct the B.P. John Development Center for
the mentally retarded. The 19 bed facility is to provide
diagnostic, psychological, psychiatric, therapeutic, vocational and avocational services for the mentally retarded.
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8) Institutions.

Oregon has two large residential

institutions for the mentally retarded.--The Eastern Oregon
Hospital and Training Center in Pendelton and the Fairview
Training Center in Salem. 98 The two state operated institutions house mentally retarded who were either involuntarily
committed or voluntary admitted to a state mental health
facility. 99 The institutions are generally restricted in the
.
.
h a b i·1·itation
services
provi'd e d • lOO
98
The actual physical facilities of the Fairview Training Center, formerly the Fairview Hospital and Training ,
Center,have been viewed by millions of Americans, since many
of the scenes for the film, One Flew over the Cuckoo's Nest
were shot on location there.
99
Voluntary admission and involuntary commitment are
discussed in Chapter III.
100

Tu per v. Fairview Hospital and Trainin Center,
276 Or. 657,
P.2d
1976) gives some indication that
many of the restrictIOils are being reduced and there is at
least some effort in providing treatment. (Tupper who was
employed at the institution as a psychiatric aide had as
one of his duties the supervision and training of "residents"
living in one of several small, dormitory-like "cottages."
His responsibilities included maintaining a "program book"
in which the progress made by his residents in various
training programs was recorded. When he either lost or
failed to keep the book, he was discharged. Tupper appealed
his discharge, which was affirmed by the courts.)

49

RESEARCH
Research purposes, po:;:ocedures, and design on mental
retardation have been as varied as the large, heterogeneous
population itself.

The rather recent, but rapidly increasing

research has been basic and applied, with conclusions drawn
from studies with the mentally retarded population and from
generalized learning principles from studies with normal populations.

Studies have been done with mildly retarded "slow''

learners to the profoundly retarded and in classrooms, wards,
group homes and work settings.

There are at least three

broad areas of research involved with retardation: 1) etiology,
diagnosis and classification, and

prevention~

2) basic labor-

atory research on learning and memory processes; and 3) learning and other principles applied in vocational, educational,
and treatment facility settings.

It is the research concerned

with treatment facilities and plans in the third area that is
of primary interest when considering the right to treatment,
but conclusions from the other areas and their implications
for treatment/habilitation plans are mentioned first.
Etiology
The first area is a medical approach, dealing with
etiology, diagnosis and classification, and prevention.
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A majo;rity of federal funding ;fo;r research in mental retarda,tion and a p:t"ima,ry th;rust Qf the

P;resident~s

Committee

on Mental Retardation is on discovering etiology and methods
of prevention.

Factors involved in etiology include brain

damage, genetics, physical environment, psychological, and
psychosocial disadvantage.

The genetic versus environ-

mentalist debate is partially responsible for the thrust of
research and interest in etiology,

The 1959 AAMD Diag-

nostic Manual attached importance to the role of genetic
factors while the 1973 version reflects a very environmentalistic position.

The fact remains that in most cases a

cause is unidentified.

Treatment or habilitation plans

might be better made when causes are known but such plans
cannot await a full understanding of etiology, nor do they
need to in order to be effective.
Lab Research
The second area of research deals with learning and
memory.

As basic lab research, this is one of the most

active areas in psychology in general and in the field of
mental retardation in particular since, by definition, a
fundamental difference in the retarded is a slower, more
inefficient way of acquiring knowledge,and skills.

Between
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1954 and 1974 over 1500 studies of learning processes were
101
conducted with retarded individuals.
Vocational train,..
ing, academic education, and learning self help and basic
living skills are essential in any habilitation program.
Robinson and Robinson conclude from a review of research
on learning and memory processes in the retarded that a
major problem for the retarded is the inability to employ
strategies.

They also conclude that training in most aspects

of learning is effective, but generalization of effects is
102
- .
103
very limited.
Weisberg
reviewed operant procedures
in lab research with the retarded and, while suggesting
that generalizations to nonlaboratory settings are especially
difficult with retarded, concludes that all retarded seem
cabable of some degree of learning.
Berkson and Landesman-Dwyer, 104 in a review of behavioral research on severe and profound mental retardation,
(1955-74) document a large scientific literature on the
lOlRo b'inson & Robinson, supra,
102Id.
103

weisberg,l?., Operant Prodedures With the Retardate:
An Overview of Laboratory :Research, in Ellis,N.R. (ed.)
International Review of Research in Mental Retardation, Vol.
5. New York: Academic Press, 1971, 113-145.
l04Berkson,G. & Landesman-Dwyer,s., Behavior Research
on Severe and Profound Mental Retardation (1955-1974),
American Journal of Mental Retardation Deficiency, 1977,
81, 428.
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behavioral potential of severely and profoundly retarded
persons.

1\s a result of the

t~end

towa.rd emphasis on an

experimental orientation from the previous emphasis on
diagnosis and classification, it has been repeatedly shown
that the severely-profoundly retarded no longer should be
considered hopeless and untrainable. 105

This body of

research validates the right to treatment movement in that
it suggests that all retarded can benefit from treatment and
therefore are entitled to treatment/habilitation and not to
be placed on back wards in a custodial manner.
Vocational and Educational Settings
The third area deals with research in vocational,
educational and treatment facility settings.

Gold has re106
viewed research on vocational habilitation prior to 1973.
He states that vocational training of the mentally retarded,

which presently utilizes resources of the three primary
disciplines--rehabilitation, psychology and education, should
also use industrial management and industrial engineering
as sources for training the mentally retarded.

Schools and

l0 6 Gold,M.W., Research on the Vocational Habilitation
of the Retarded; The Present, The Future, in Ellis,N.R. (ed.)
International Review of Research in Mental Retardation. Vol.
6. New York: Academic Press, 1973, 97.
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workshops are the major sources ;for training the retarded.
The sheltered workshop movement has resulted in
the establishment o;f three main types of workshops
for the retarded: the transitional shop, where clients
coming from school programs, homes, or institutions
prepare for placement into competitive employment;
the extended care or terminal shop, where clients
believed to be incapable of achieving competitive
employment work for indefinite periods; and the
comprehensive shop which attempts to service both
types of clients.107
The current trend is toward a program of habilitation
combining academic instruction, vocational classes, and
on-the-job training.

Programs individually designed, as

called for in the Wyatt decision, are most successful.
The programs state that on-the-job expectations and amounts
of responsibility and freedom are gradually

increased~

how-

ever, Gold notes two discrepancies between plan and implementation.

First, although opportunities exist, "training ••.

almost without exception refers to exposure
ment, or

~~ther

than treat-

it refers to placing clients on a job station where

it is hoped training occurs. 11108

Crossmanl09 in an article

107
Id.

108
Gold,~§upra,

100.

109
Crossman,J.E., A Technique for Programming Sheltered
Workshop Environments for Training Severely Retarded Workers.
American Journal of Mental Deficiency, 1969, 73, 814-818.
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on severely retaJ:;'ded workers, noted that the usual pattern
is to rind work that retardates can do instead of training.
Gold's :review, primarily descriptions of facilities
and programs, notes poor incentives for the mentally retarded as a further discrepancy between plan and implementation.
In most facilities the most obvious incentive, money, was
usually given noncontingently in very small amounts.

There

was little opportunity for the acquisition of skills in money
management since everything was free. The pay scale for
workers in institutions and sheltered workshops has recently
undergone a tremendous change.110

The situation would be

excellent for testing the effects of token and monetary
rewards for work, except for at least two disadvantages for
research--limited staff and dependence of workshops on
contracts.

But Gold reports that monetary and token

110
Weidenfeller v. Kidulis, supra. (Institutons
residents who were not paid for work they were required to
perform could obtain any withheld pay and other related
damages in the courts if they could also show the work was
nontherapeutic.)
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systems

111

and goal setting by the workers and the presence
112
of a model worker
and video-taped playback of on-the-job
performance 113 did increase productivity.
Birnbrauer in a more recent review also acknowledges
problems in research but has seven general conclusions regarding research on vocational habilitation and the
114
retarded:
1) Combined µse of modeling and reinforcement principles
has been shown to be more effective than less systematic
approaches in increasing skills.

The results were most

impressive when the behavior measured was attention to work.
111

Huddle,D.D., Work Performance of Trainable Adults
as Influenced by Competition, Cooperation, and Monetary
Reward. American Journal of Mental Deficiency, 1967, 72, 198~
Hunt,J.G. & Zimmerman,J., Stimulating Productivity in-a
Stimulated Sheltered Workshop Setting. American Journal of
Mental Deficiency, 1969, 74, 43; Logan,D.L., Kinsinger,J.;
Shelton,G. & Brown,J .M., iJihe Use of Multiple Reinforcers in
a Rehabilitation Setting. Mental Retardation, June, 1971, 9,
3.

-

112

Kliebhan,J., Effects of Goal-setting and Modeling
on Job Performance of Mentally Retarded Adolescent. American
Journal of Mental Deficiency, 1967, 73, 220.
113ne Roo,W,M. & Haralson,H.L., Increasing Workshop
Production Through Self-Visualization on Videotape. Mental
Retardation, August 1971, 2_, 22.
114
Birnbrauer,J.S., Mental Retardation, in Leitenberg,
H. (ed.) Handbook of Behavior Modification and Behavior
Therapy, New Jersey: l?rentice-.Hall, 1976, 361-404.
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He recommends analvzinq the components of strategies, hypothesis testing, problem solving,. and abstracting relevant
information and developing programs to teach these problemsol ving skills as well as specific tasks.
2) Combinations of instructions, demonstrations,
physical guidance, and reinforcement have effected changes
in a variety of responses with many retardates in many
contexts.
3) Several studies support that response-reinforcer
contingency is an essential aspect of some improvements in
behavior.
4) Studies have effected changes in rates of behavior
that existed prior to intervention; intervention programs
increased an infrequently occurring response or brought
certain behaviors under stimulus, situational, or agent
control.
5) Retardates are very sensitive to reinforcement
contingencies; that is, they acquire discriminations rapidly.
6) Punishment effects dramatic decreases in behavior
temporarily.

Birnbrauer states that

although I can think of no alternative but to apply
severe punishment is some cases, I have seen nothing
that has led me to change my opinion that suppression
is a~ be~t only the beginning of a program of habili tation. 5
115 Birnbrauer ,J. s., Generalization of Punishment .·
Effects--A Case Study. Journal of Applied Behavio·r Analysis,
1968, _!_, 201.
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7) Variables controlling such repetitive acts as selfinjurious behavi.or remain a puzzle.
In research specific .to the classroom with the mentally
retarded dramatic changes in classroom behavior is effected
by manipulation of response consequences.

There are two

problems: 1) maintenance of gains, and 2) although class
behavior has been affected in impressive ways, academic learning has not been. 116 Modeling, social reinforcement and
tokens have been found effective in teaching social problem
solving, 117 motor skills, 118 game skills and number concepts,119
116
Roas,S.A. Effects of Intentional Training in Social
Behavior on Retarded Children. American Journal of Mental
Deficiency, 1969(a), 73, 912.
117
Id.
118
Ross, S.A. Effects of an Intensive Motor Skills
Training Program on Young Educable Mentally Retarded Children.
American Journal of Mental Deficiency, 1969(b), 73, 920.
119
Ross, D.M. Incidental Learning of Number Concepts in
Small Group Games. American Journal of Mental Deficiency,
1970, 2_!, 718.
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listening skills,

120

and problem

solv~ng

and planning.

121

In an interesting study by Graubard, Rosenberg and
Miller 122 the purpose was to teach the retarded children in
special classes to modify the behavior of peers and teachers.
Students were taught to reinforce positive teacher response
by establishing eye contact, nodding, and giving thanks for
help,

for example.

The studentst behavior in class was

changed for the better through this procedure.
Individual programs and special methods have shown that
even severely retarded can learn. 123

A review of the studies

of special educational intervention for the educable and
120

Ross,D.M. & Ross,S.A., The Efficacy of Listening
Training for Educable Mentally Retarded Children. American
Journal of Mental Deficiency, 1972, 77, 137.
121 Ross,D.M. & Ross,S.A. Cognitive Training for the EMR
Child: Situational Problem Solving and Planning. American
Journal of Mental Deficiency, 1973, 78, 20.
122
Graubard, P.S., Rosenberg,H. & Miller,M.B., Student
Applications of Behavior Modification to Teachers and
Environments of Ecological Approaches to Social Deviancy,
in Ramp, E.A. & Hopkins,B.s. (eds.), A New Direction for
Education: Behavior Analysis. Vol. l.· Lawrence, Kansas: The
University of Kansas Support and Development Center for Follow
Through, 1971, 80-101.
123
Fuller,R, Breaking Down the IQ Walls: Severely
Reta.rded People Can Learn to Read, Psychology Today, Oct. 197 4,
97-100.
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trainable retarded states that results are inconclusive.1 24
Research is needed on the

~uestion

of special classes versus

integrated classes for the retarded since mainstreaming is
the concept currently being put into practice.

Robinson and

Robinson review one of the few studies using random assign ...
ment 125 which found that all retarded children in the special
classes appeared to be
somewhat better off in emotional adjustment and peer
acceptance ••• and the group with IQs above 75 did
better in regular classrooms, whereas the EMR group
with lower IQs made more progress in special classes. 126
In a study by Budoff and Gottlieb 127 academic, personal
and social growth were compared for a special class of
124

.
Kaufman & Alberto, Research on Efficacy of Special
Education for the Mentally Retarded, in Ellis,N.R. (ed.)
International Review of Research in Mental Retardation, Vol.
8, 1976, supra.
125

Goldstein,H., Moss,J.W. & Jordan,L.J. The Efficacy
of Special Class Training on the Development of Mentally
Retarded Children. Urbana; University of Illinois, Institute
for Research on Exceptional Children, 1965.
126Id.
127Budoff ,M, & Gottlieb,J. Special Class EMR Children
Mainstreamed: A Study of An Aptitude (Learning Potential) X
Treatment Interaction, American Journal of Mental Deficiency,
1976, g, 1.
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educable mentally retarded.

One _half remained in special

classes and one half were placed in regular classes.

After

one year the integrated students were more controlled and had
more positive feelings about school and themselves, indicating that the more able educable mentally retarded benefitted
from integration in regular classes.
Treatment Facilities
Most research concerning treatment facilities has been
done within one particular type of facility.

A purpose with-

in wards is to explore the potential of behavior modification
in training self-help and social skills for the severely and
profoundly retarded, and in non-residential settings to explore the behavioral training procedures and other types of
therapy with the educable mentally retarded.

Little has been

done to compare types of treatment facilities with each other,
for instance the effects of group home living versus institution.
There is a large number of studies of punishment such
as seclusion, restraint, removal from the dining room, electric shock and overcorrection.

The use of punishment is a

major difference between the studies in wards and in other
settings.

This may be because the behaviors chosen to modify

were those most aversive to the limited staff in wards--eating habits and toilet needs.

Education, training, positive

rein£orcement and modeling all require considerable staff with
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special skills.

Time Out has also been found effective with
128
the severely and profoundly retarded.
The effectiveness

of procedures such as Time Out, over-correction, reinforcement and modeling need to be carefully studied considering
the recent constraints on the use of shock and other aversive
"therapy" or limits on primary needs (food).
McCarver 129 reviews the literature dealing with placement of the retarded in the community after institutionalization.

He states that the literature is inconclusive, dis-

crepant and contradictory, mainly unable to reliably predict
who will or will not succeed on community placement because
most studies were post hoc surveys.

Those institutionalized

for the least amount of time were more successful in all areas
of community adjustment (residential stability, employment,
money management, sexual adjustment and social behaviors) ;
however, length of stay was not a variable manipulated by
the experimenters.

The current development of alternatives

128

Birnbrauer, supra.
"Time Out" has been defined as
"contingent removal of the opportunity to earn positive reinforcement" and "contingent social isolation". Craighead,
W.E., Kazkin,A.E., Mahoney,M.J., Behavior Modification,
Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1976, 237.
12 9McCarver,R.B. & Craing,E.M. Placement of the
Retarded in the Community: Prognosis and Outcome, in Ellis,
N. (ed.) International Review of Research in Mental Retardation, Vol. 7, supra, 1974.
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to residential facilities underscores a need for research of
these ;t;acilities and comparisons of facilities.

Since the

major trend is for placement into small community group
homes as opposed to institutiona,l care, the efficacy of group
homes needs further evaluation.

Moen, Bogen and Aanes 130

found a low failure rate (as measured by recidivism) for
residents placed in group homes from institutions; fewer
than 15% of these placed in group homes needed return or
readmission to institutional care.

In a subsequent study,

Aanes and Moen 131 attempt to make a more objective assessment of group homes increasing the level of functioning by
using the Adaptive Behavior Scale in a pre- and post-test
evaluation design, the tests being given in the group home
before training and again one year later.

Statistical

comparisons were made for ten domains and 23 subdomains
of the ABS and on three of the domains and eight of the subdomain areas there were significantly higher levels of functioning.

130Moen,M., Bogen,n. & Aanes,D. Follow ... up of Mentally
Retarded Adults Successfully and Unsucce~sfully Placed In
Community. Hospital and Community Psychiatry, 1975, 26(11),
752.
....
131Aanes,D. & Moen,M.
'
.
Adapt i ve Behavior
Changes o f
Group Home Residents. Mental Retardation, 1976 (Aug} 14(4),
36.
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EVALUATION
·Measuring the success of treatment has traditionally
been assumed by the mental health profession,

The question

of treatment itself was examined in Eysenck's 1965 study of
the effects of psychotherapy on the treatment of the mentally
ill.

He concluded:
[p]sychoanalysis is no more successful than any other
method, and that in fact all methods of psychotherapy
fail to improve on the recovery rate obtained through
ordinary life experience and non-specific treatment. 1 32
As will be discussed in Chapter IV, courts have now

held that the mentally retarded have a right to adequate
treatment.

Courts and commentators frequently use the terms

"adequate", ,.permissible", "appropriate", and "responsible''
to describe the r~quired treatment. 133

These terms are im-

precise and courts are still faced with the applicable standard to be used. Courts have held that "adequate treatment"
means each patient be given a "realistic opportunity to be

132 Eysenck, The Effects of Psychotherapy, International
Journal of Psychiatry, 1965, 1, 99. Therapies based upon
learning theories were excluded from the study, but Eysenck
suggested they might be effective.
133

Schwitzgegel,.R.K. The Right to Effective Mental
Treatment, California Law Review, 197 4, '62, 936.
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cured or improved", 1 34 "show therapeutic progress'',

135

or be treated under the" least restrictive alternative'!

136

To determine whether or not the treatment provided
at a particular institution or by a particular agency is
adequate the courts must set standards and evaluate the
treatment actually provided.
The right to treatment, if it is to become more than
idealistic rhetoric devoid of practical social consequences, must be measured by clear standards. The
courts, legislatures, treatment personnel, and
attornej_l!S must have some precise standard in mind
by which they can determine whether the amount of
treatment provided or not provided for a p~3~ent
is an appropriate matter for legal action.
Thus evaluation of treatment is now a responsibility of the
courts as well as mental health professionals.

Courts in

making their evaluations, however, rely upon the testimony of
psychologists to learn the nature of mental retardation,
kinds of treatment suitable for particular mentally retarded
persons, and standard treatment methods.

It has been sug-

gested that a reasonable standard of treatment is
134
Wyatt v. Stickney, supra.
135
Jackson
136
Welsh

v.

v.

Indiana 406

u.s.

373 (1972).

Likens, 373 F.Supp, 487, 501 (D.Minn. 1974).

137
Schwitzgebel,R~K.,Right To Treatment for the Mentally
Disabled: TheNeed for Realistic Standards, Harvard Civil
Rights'--Civil Liberties Law Review, 197 3, .!!_, 513, 515.
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.
138
e ff ectrveness.
To evaluate the effectiveness of treatment courts use
one or more of the following criteria: 1) structure of the
institution, 2) process of treatment delivery and 3) treatment outcome.139

A structural analysis, which is the most

commonly suggested approach and probably the easiest to
use, includes such things as the size of the institution,
staff-patient ratios and per capita costs.140
in Martalla

v.

Kelley 1 41

For example,

the court examined the ratio of

138

Id.
139
Schwitzgebel.R., California Law Review, supra.
140
Schwitzgebel.R., Harvard Civil Rights--Civil Liberties
Law Review, supra.Birnbaum in The Right to Treatment, American
Bar Association Journal, 1960, 46, 499 suggested that courts
adopt the American Psychiatric Association Standards for
Hospital and Clinics which required: one physician for every
40 patients, one psychologist for every 60, one nurse for
every 15, one social worker for every 35, one aid for every
2.5 patients. This has been used by the courts even though
in 1969 the American Psychiatric Association revised its
position and no longer required minimum ratios.
141
349 F.Supp. 575 (S.D. N.Y. 1972).
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professional personnel to the patients, the training and
poor conununication among the personnel and the lack of
information about each patient to determine that the treatment was inadequate.
Stickney

143

Rouse

v.

Catneron 142 and Wyatt v.

analyzed the size of the institution, staff-

patient ratios and per capita costs.

In Wyatt, for example,

the court found having the ratio of one physician per
5,000 patients could not provide adequate treatment.
While the criteria for evaluation and evaluation itself are relatively simple, under the structural approach
a facility may be structurally adequate and still not provide
effective treatment.

The mere presence of a sufficient

number of staff does not mean they will actually treat patients.
Mere availability of treatment modalities without optimal combinations for each patient will not amount to treatment.
Structural aspects concerning size, expenditure and staff
training may be useful in a broad range of analyzing treatment, but not treatment outcome. 144
142 373 F.2d 451 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
143

334 F.Supp. 1341 (M,D. Ala, 1972).

144 schwitzgebel,R., Harvard Civil Rights.--CiVil Liberties
Law Review, supra.
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The process of treatment delivery as an evaluation tool
examines whether or not the treatment purportedly available
at the institution is actually delivered to the
retarded person.

mentally

This type o:f review was required in Wyatt

where the court required treatment plans, periodic review and
a record of therapy. 145

Use of such an evaluative tool in a

Missouri study revealed that the average patient in mental
health centers spent only 2.01 hours per week in traditional
forms of individual and group therapy, but the average
patient in state hospitals spent only .31 hours per week in
146
these types of therapy.
A review of patients' treatment
plans will show whether an effective treatment plan was
implemented with direct service to the patient.

While this

criterion for evaluation may accuratley measure delivery of
services, it also has deficiencies.

For example, if

commonly accepted practices are inadequate, an impressive
145

344 F.Supp. 373, 384-385 (M.D. Ala. 1972).

146Evenson, Neumenhuizen, Sletten & Cho, A Computerized
Survey of Treatment Used In Missouri Institutions. Hospital
& Community Psychiatry, 1973, 24, 23.
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.
.
. 1 • 147
delivery
recor d may b e 1nconsequent1a

An examination

of patient records may measure the quantity of therapy, but
the relationship between quantity and quality is uncertain.
A third criteria which may be used in evaluating the
effectiveness of treatment is the treatment outcome approach.
The question then for evaluating treatment is simply
the results?"

11

What are

Information showing the percent of patients

released from the institution and recidivism rates might show
the effectiveness of the institution as a whole.

An effective

treatment outcome evaluative tool is what has been called a
contract fulfillment analysis. 148

Outpatients at a mental

health clinic and the therapist set a treatment goal.

When

the treatment is concluded the patient and a follow-up
worker review the contract and record the degree of fulfillment of the outlined goals.
Use of the outcome approach is the most direct and
accurate in evaluating treatment.

However, a recent United

States Supreme Court decision leaves the viability of this
147 schwitzgebel,R., Harvard Civil Rights--Civil Liberties
Law Review, supra.
148Lombilla, Kiresak & Sherman, Evaluating a Community
Mental Health Program: Contract Fulfillment Analysis,
Hospital and Community Psychia,try, 1973, 24, 760.
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evaluation criterion by the courts in doubt.

149

Courts may use a combination of these three evaluative
criteria in evaluating the adequacy of the treatment provided.

These three criteria, particularly the latter, may

be of value to mental health professionals as well in
.
.
150
uat1ng the adequacy of treatment given.

eval-

SUMMARY
Archaic models have inhibited acceptance of modern
psychological theories for dealing with mental retardation.
Much legislation and judicial opinions presuppose the validity
of the archaic models.

Litigation involving the right to

treatment and interdisciplanary activities and publications
are discrediting the archaic models.
The normalization principle is generally recognized by
psychologists and those in special education and has been
implemented not only in Sweden but also attempts are being

149 oonaldson v. O'Connor, supra. (The appellate court
said that the mentally, retarded had a right to such treatment as would cure or at least improve each mentally retarded's
condition, The Supreme Court vacated this opinion with Chief
Justice Bul;'ger in a concurring opinion indicating the courts
could not require any kind of outcome.)
150Moos & Schwartz, Treatment Environment and Treatment
Outcome, Journal of Nervous and Mental Disease, 1972, 154,
264, found no clear relationship between staff-patient ratios
and success in the communities.
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lt\s.de in the UnLted States,

ImJ?lementing the normalization

principle will have great impact on the lives of the mentally
retarded and the facilities purJ?ortedly or actually serving
them.

Normalization requires moving the mentally retarded

out of the institution and into the community, providing
therapeutic activities in sheltered workshops, integration
in classrooms, residing in

family .... like settings, and less

restriction under the law.
As will be discussed in Chapter IV, courts are now
examining the treatment offered the mentally retarded and
have developed standards for evaluating the treatment the
mentally retarded are receiving.

It is important both in the

evaluative process and in the delivery of services to recognize that treatment is an ongoing process affected by the
total environment.

It has been suggested that behavioral

procedures for the mentally retarded have as specific objectives:
1) to increase competence to cope with the environment;
2) to foster increasingly more complex adaptive behavior,
and
3) to enhance human qualities. 15 1
151
Guidelines for the Use of Behavioral ~rocedure in
State Programs for Retarded persons, Monograph, Arlington,
Texas: National Association for Retarded Citizens, 1976.

71

CHAPTER III
LAW AND THE MENTALLY RETARDED: AN OVERVIEW

The development of the law at it affects the rights of
the mentally disabled has been.dependent on three factors:
1) the extent of medical knowledge on cause, care and proper
treatment of the mentally disabled; 2) the degree to which
the politically organized community has acknowledged its
responsibility for the care and treatment of its afflicted
citizens; and 3) the legal profession's awareness of the
social realities of mental disability, as well as the acuteness of its concern for those who neither have relatives nor
close friends to safeguard their rights. 152 In each of these
areas, there are new interests or developments in mental
retardation, which make mental retardation a contemporary
inter-disciplinary issue; 1) research with the mentally
retarded, discussed in Chapter II, is revealing a new picture
of retardation in a developmental model; 2) society seems
152
Brackel & Rock, supra.
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ready to participate in the problems of the retarded; 153 and
3) the courts and legislatures are resolving legal rights.
Recent developments in securing the rights of the
mentally retarded to habilitation have been the result of
increased scienti-fic understanding of mental retardation and
recognition that ancient legal restrictions and definitions
are inconsistent with this new understanding.

Progress is

being made to establish a legal right to treatment, but prerequisite to sustained legal rights is increased public and
professional education of the great developmental potential
of the mentally retarded.

The change is sometimes slow due

to a long history of misconceptions regarding mental retardation.

Conflicts in theory, laws, and treatment practices

have resulted in the modern treatment controversies.
Historical traditions, stereotypes and beliefs concerning mental retardation, and desires of legislators and
judges to assist the mentally retarded while protecting society
have resulted in laws
ed.154

spec~fically

for the mentally retard.-

These special rules include; l} civil commitment; 155

153 see pages 19-21 for a discussion of four organizations.
Additional organizations are enumerated and discussed in
Gearheart & Litton, supra.
154 Kin
. d re d , Coh.
en, supra.
155

0RS Chapt. 427.
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2) legal incompetency; 156

3) guardianship or conservator-

ship to manage the daily financial and personal affairs of
the person; l.J57

4)criminal law;l58 5) restrictions on com-

munity rights such as entering into any contract~59
160
a wi· 11 ,

161
b r i nging
'
• · 1 sui• t s,
civi

making

• •
,
I s
o b taining
a d river

license, testifying in court as a witness and serving as a

juror; 1 ~ 2

and 6) restrictions on personal rights and family

life such as sterilization, annulment of marriage and involuntary adoption of his children.lb'3

The areas of law

enumerated above as they impinge upon the personal liberty
of the mentally retarded are discussed in this chapter.
15{)

Id.
157
158

ORS Chapt. 126.
ORS Chapt. 161.

159
Gindhart v. Skourtes, 271 Or. 115, 530 P.2d 827 (1975).
160
ORS Chapt. 112.
161
Mullen v. Bruce, 168 Cal.App. 2d 494, 335 P.2d 945
(1959).

162
See ORS 482.120 regarding driver's license.
163

ORS 109.310.
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he will be co:mmi.tted. 166

l.n ac.tuql p;cactice the involuntary

commitment procedure ;for the mentally deficient is rarely
usea. 167
Once the actual decision to commit is made the mentally
deficient person remains in the facility except for any leaves
of absence.

The person is re-examined some time after com-

mitment to determine whether he should remain.

The mentally

ill person may be committed for a period not to exceed
166 oRS 427.062. The statutes relating to involuntary
commitment of the mentally ill contain more procedural .requirement. s including appointment of an attorney unless exprtjssly
waived; the mentally ill person will be committed if mentally
ill and in need of treatment, care or custody because ~e
suffers from a mental disorder and is dangerous to him~elf
or others or is unable to provide for his basic person~l needs.
there will be at least two hearings and unlike the men~ally
retarded person who is simply told that he has the rig~t to
be represented by an attorney the judge will appoint am
attorney to represent the mentally ill person ''unless counsel,
is expressly, knowingly and intelligently refused by the
person." ORS 426.100(2). Strict proof is required showing
that the person is dangerous to himself or others .or unable
to provide for his basic needs before he may be committed.
State v. O'Neil, 274 Or. 59, 545 P.2d 96 (1976).
167 statistics show only one in Multnomah County, Oregon
for the year 1976. (Multnomah County Probate Court, telephone
conversation, DEc., 1976). The majority of those mentally
retarded who are committed are committed "voluntarily" while
they are minors by their parents. The mentally ill-mentally
retarded categories are not mutually exclusive and in Oregon
many go through the commitment procedures for the mentally ill
because it is simpler. Inter-insititutional transfer is not
difficult and the mentally retarded individual may then be
transferred after being committed. (Interview with Jeffrey s.
Mutnick, formerly with Multnomah County Public Defender's
Office. Jan. 5, 1976).

74

CIVIL COMMITMENT
In Oregon, involuntary commitment of the mentally
deficient may be commenced by "any citizen" filing a petition
with the county probate judge.

The petition must allege that

the person who is the subject of the petition is mentally
. .
t and in
. nee d o f care, cus t o d y or t raining.
. .
1'&4
d e f ic1en

The

judge then examines the petition and observes the person personally at a hearing.

If after "viewing" the person and

reviewing the petition, the judge thinks that the person is
in need of care, custody or training, the judge orders a
precommitment mental and physical examination at Fairview
Training Center in Salem or some other suitable institutionl6 5
The person must be examined in seven days and findings of
deficiency and recommendations forwarded to the court within
30 days.

The court conducts another hearing after receiving

the recommendations.

If

the court determines the person is

mentally deficient and in need of care, custody or training
164
ORS 427. 015. (Present statutes use the term mentally
deficient. SB 79 introduced in the 1977 Oregon Legislature
substituted the term mentally retarded for mentally deficient
among many.,, ..o:ther- chan9es ., The bill, however, never got out
of committee • )
165

0RS 427.025.
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180 days~ 168

He will onlx be held beyond that period if the

treating facility certifies to the judge that the person is
still mentally ill.

The mentally ill person may protest and

have a hearing before the judge.

:rf he is found mentally ill

he will remain in the institution, but again only for 180
days unless the above procedure is followed. 169
A person may voluntarily seek admission to a mental
health facility, 170 but many question whether for the mentally
. .
.
.
d e f icient
person, as k'ing f or commitment
is
ever vo 1 untary. 171

In the case of a minor or incompetent person, the admission,
even though termed t1voluntary" may not be voluntary, because
the application must be made by the parent or person entitled
to custody. 172

Whoever makes the application, the person

thought to be mentally retarded is examined at the mental
health facility and admitted if found in need of care, custody
or training.

The person who is voluntarily admitted as a

168 0RS 426.130.
169
0RS 426.301.
170

oRS 427,210~260.

171

Kind;red, Cohen et al., supra\

172 oRS 427.220.
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minor whether mentally ill or mentally retarded by his parents
will be examined by a physician and psychologist and based
upon their report will either be released or committed as an
involuntary patient~ 17 3
Once admitted the mentally deficient person can be released only upon 30 days written notice unless the facility
successfully petitions the court to have the person's status
.
1 un t ary. l 7 4
c h ange d f rom vo 1 untary to invo

Th e no t ice
'
mus t

indicate the proposed future treatment plan. There are several
discrepancies between the rights afforded the mentally def icient and mentally ill in Oregon: one of these is the voluntarily admitted mentally ill patient can be released in 72
hours of his request unless his status is changed through the
courts from voluntary to involuntary.
LEGAL INCOMPETENCY
Voluntary admission or involuntary commitment to a
mental health facility does not mean that the person is
173

0RS 427,250. Bal:;'tley
(E.D. Pa. 1975).
174
ORS 427.225.-240,

v.

Kremens, 402 F.Supp. 1039
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legaliy incompetent.

175

If a jud9e finds a committed person

incompetent, a guardian will be appointed for the person.
In addition, the person will be unable to enter into a con. a d river
.'
' s l'1cense. 176
t rac t , ma k e a w1'11 , or o b ta1n

Any

subsequent marriage may be annuled as well.
Procedural requirements must be followed before a person is found incompetent because the person suffers a·serious
loss of liberty even beyond commitment.

First, a hearing

instigated by the person, his guardian, relative or creditor,
or other interested person, must be held before the probate
judge. 177

The person must appear and be informed of his right

to an attorney and subpoena wi tnes'ses.

The judge will appoint

an attorney to represent him unless the person "expressly,
knowingly and intelligently refused legal counsel. 11178

The

175 oRS 427.305. "Incompetency" is not defined; however,
statutes relating to appointment of a guardian define an
"incapacitated person as one ••who is unable, without assistance, to properly manage or take care of himself or his
personal affairs." ORS 126,003. Presumably, a similar
standard would be used to determine incompetency.
176Each of these is discussed later. A person may not
be able to do any of the things listed even though not found
legally incompetent.
177
o:RS 427.31.0.
178
Id. (It would seem that when competency is at issue
legal counsel would be necessary since one might not be in a
positition to intelligently and knowingly refuse.}

79
court may appoint any private physician to examine the mental
condition of the person~ 79
When the mentally ill or mentally retarded person is
released from the mental health facility, he will be found
competent if the chief medical officer believes him to be.
If not, the mentally retarded person, his guardian, relative,
creditor, or other interested person, may petition the court
for a hearing~SO

If he is still found incompetent, the

guardian will remain and the other restrictions outlined
earlier will continue until or if a legal designation of
competency is restored.
GUARDIANSHIP
A guardian or conservator may be appointed for any person including the mentally deficient person without any legal
finding of incompetency required.

A guardianship is created

for the protection of the person's property.

To have a

guardian appointed the judge must find the person incapacitated (Unable to take care of himself or his personal affairs)
and the appointment of a guardian is necessary or desirable
179
ORS 427.325.
180
ORS 427.310(3).

80
as a mea.ns of providing continuing care and supervision of
181
the person.
The procedure commences by the incapacitated
person, or any person interested in his welfare, petitioning
the probate court for appointment of a guardian.

If anyone

objects to the petition, the court will appoint an attorney
to represent the alleged incapacitated person, a physician to
examine the person, and an officer, employee or appointee to
the court to interview the person and prepare a report.

If

objections to the petition are raised, the person may be
present at the hearing to hear or see evidence relating to
his condition, and may through his attorney present evidence,
and cross-examine the witnesses including the court appointed
physician and interviewer.
closed to the public.

If requested the hearing will be

182

The guardian may be any person qualified and willing to
serve, but the court gives preference to relatives and to
persons requested by the incapacitated person in writing while
183
he was competent.
A gua~dian so appointed remains the
guardian of the person until the guardian or the ward (the
181

oRS

126.107.

182oRS 126.103.

183

0RS 126.035.
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incapacitated person for whom the guaz-dianship was created):
1) dies, 2} becomes incapacitated, 3} is removed or resigns,
or 4) the court orders that the incapacity no longer ex-,:
. t·S. 184

J.S

Once appointed, the guardian acts as a parent of
He may have custody, arrange for training and ed-

the ward.

ucation, take care of the ward's personal property, consent
to medical and professional care and dispose

of the ward's

property to meeet limited expenses unless a conservator has
been appointed.
Appointment of a conservator is similar to appointment
of a guardian.

A conservator may be appointed to manage a

person's property if the court finds he is unable to manage
his property and affairs effectively because of mental illness
or mental deficiency
management.

afid~-has

pr0perty or money in nEfed of

If the mentally deficient person has nt friends

or relatives willing to serve as guardian or conservator
and the Board of County Commissioners determines oni should
be appointed, a public guardian and conservator may/be appointed by the court under the same p~ocedures discussed above. 185
1

Guardianship is intended to protect a person tho can1

not care for himself.

The statute does not provide/ for an

examination or even interview by a person trained ih psychol ....
ogy.

The guardian, who may be a relative, is to prbvided for
!

184
185

0RS 126.137.

ORS 126.905, 126.925.
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the education and training of the mentally deficient person.
There is no provision for professional assistance in selecting the appropriate training or education for the individual.
If rehabilitation or habilitation is the goal, the statutes
should specifically provide for professional assistance in
selection, training and education.

A conservatorship is

less for the benefit of the incapacitated person than for
the children, creditors and even the state to whom the person
may be indebted.

It is designed to protect the assets of the

person and to see that his needs are met financially.

Two

problems exist: l} the statute ,tates that the court must
find that the person cannot effectively manage his affairs,
but does not offer further explanation;

and 2} again no

provision is made for examination or interview by a person
trained in psychology.

Few individuals manage financial

affairs as effectively as possible.

Unwise investments are

made and unnecessary goods and services are bought.

Further-

more, management of financial affairs, however ineptly, may
result in a sense of accomplishment encouraging self-reliance
or perhaps the seeking of additional training.
A serious question as to the advisability of a guard-

ianship exists when the advice and provision of social services
would serve as we11. 186
186

In many cases limited guardianship or

Kindred et al., supra.
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conservato;rship with less restrictive controls, giving the
wal."d or protected person an opportunity to participate to the
fullest extent possible in the decisions affecting his life
and property may be more effective than the traditional forms.
CRIMINAL LAW
In Oregon criminal law, a person may not be legally
guilty of criminal conduct because: 1) a mental disease or
defect causes him to lack sufficient mental capacity to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or 2) a mental disease

or defect prevents him from conforming his conduct to
the requirements of the law. 187 If the criminal defendant is
found not guilty by reason of mental disease or defect he may
be committed to a mental health facility.

He will be committed

if he: 1) is still affected by mental disease or defect at the
time of the hearing, 2) is a danger to himself or others, and
3) would not be a proper subject for release or supervision
by a person appointed by the court, the Oregon Mental Health
188
Division or a community mental health program.
A person may be committed without a finding by the
court or jury that he is not guilty because of a mental disease or defect if he is found incompetent to appear before
187
ORS 161 • 2 9 5 (1)

188
ORS 161.340.

•
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f or tria
. 1 • 189
. d ge or Jury
.
t h e JU

r:e

the person later becomes

competent he may be tried ;for the crime unless at least five
years have elapsed from the time of the court's finding of
incompetency and he has been committed to a mental health
facility during this five year period. 190 A trial would be
unjust after five years.
A person who has been committed as the result of
cirminal law proceedings may be discharged if any of the
following three things occur: 1) at any time after admission
to a state mental health facility, the superintendent after
examining the person is of the opinion that the person is no
longer affected by a mental disease or defect, or if still
affected no longer presents a substantial danger to himself
or others; 2) after 90 days of custody the person, whether
mentally ill or mentally deficient, successfully applies to
the circuit court for discharge on the grounds stated in (1)
above; or 3) after five years of custody, unless the court
finds he is still affected by a mental disease or defect and
is a substantial danger to himself or others. 191
189

. incompetent
.
.
ORS 161 , 36 O, A person lS
to stand trial
if he is unable Ca.1 to unde;J;'stand the nature of the proceedings
against him; or {bl to assist and cooperate with his counsel;
or {c) to participate in his defense.
l

9

00RS 161. 370

191

oRS 161,340, 161.350.
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The court must conduct hearings to determine whether
or not the person still suffers from a mental disease or
defect, or if so affected does not present a substantial
dilln.ger to himself or others unless the superintendent of
the mental health facility files a report recommending discharge and the state does not objec~ 192

At the hearing

psychiatrists and psychologists will be called upon to examine the person and testify concerning his condition.
RESTRICTIONS IN THE COMMUNITY
The mentally retarded or the mentally ill person may be
unable to enter into a contract, make a will, bring a civil
suit or obtain a driver's license.

In most states a con-

tract which a mentally deficient person has entered into
may be

,voided if there is an inadequate consideration, fraud,

. h • '193
or a 1 ac k o f goo d f ait

In Oregon, a contract a menta 11y

incompetent person has entered into may be

.voided if the

person is incompetent to transact business and the contract
194
is g!.'lossly unfair.
For the non-retarded a contract may not
be avoided simply because it is unfair,
192

lc:m-5

:lfil~.345 ~

193

Allen,R.C., Feister,E.Z. & Weinhofen,H., Mental Impairment and Legal Competency, Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey:
Prentice~Hall, 1968.
194
Gindhart v. Skourtes, 271 Or. 115, 530 P.wd 827 (1975)
Scovil v. Barney, 4 Or. 288 (1872) {A mentally deficient person who deeded property to another for less than its value was
entitled to have his property returned because of incompetency.)

86
What constitutes the ;req;uisite competency is left to
the discretion of the judge in each case.

Mental capacity to

enter into a contract requires that the person has ability to
comprehend the nature of the transaction.

However, mere dull-

ness of intellect, ability to be easily influenced and dependency upon others does not make the person incompetent.

The

question is not whether the person understood the contract,
but was capable of understanding it,195
To make a valid will the person must be of sound mind
at the time he makes the will. 196

If the will of a person

is challenged on the ground that the testator 1 the person who
made the will, was not of "sound mind" at the time, the court
will consider whether the person: 1) comprehended the nature
of the act in which he was engaged; 2) knew the nature and
extent of all of his property at the time; 3) had in mind
195
~ruse v. Coos Head Timber co., 248 Or. 294, 432 P,2d
1009 (1967) (Person unable to read some words in contraot ..
with 83 I.Q., fifth grade performance level and easily influenced but who had been employed in manual labor was found
to be of normal1 although belo~ average intelligence and,
therefor~, competent to enter into contract.)
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the persons who were, should, or might be, the objects of
his bounty; and 4) was cognizant of the scope and provisions
1 7
. written
.
o f h is
wi· 11 • ~

. a s t at e of
A person may b e in

"extreme imbecility 11 and yet possess sufficient understanding
to direct how his property should be disposed. 1'9·a
The person who made the will is presumed to have been
of sound mind unless he had a guardian at the time he made

If he had a guardian, there is a presumption that
.
199
he lacked the mental capacity to execute a will.
That

the will.

presumption may be overcome by testimony of persons seeking
200
201
to enforce the will.
In a recent Arizona case
a testator
functioning at a mental level of 10-12 years but able to do
simple tasks and drive a car was found to have necessary
197

Vsetecka v. Novak, 4 Or.App. 463, 478 P.2d 655 (1970).

198
Chrisman v. Chrisman, 16 Or. 127, 18 Pac. 6 (1888).
199
In re Provolt's Estate, 175 Or. 128, 151 P.2d 736 {1944).
200
Whittenberry v. Whittenberry, 9 Or.App. 154, 496 P.2d
240 (1972) (Decedent who two months before he made his will
had been found incompetent by an examining psychiatrist, was
found competent to make a will based on the testimony of lay
witnesses to the signing of the will that he seemed normal.)
201
In re Teel 1 s Estate, 14 Ariz.App. 371, 483 P.2d 603
{1971).

88

capacity to execute a will,

While the capacity level re<:;tuired

to make a will is low, litigation contesting the validity of
a mentally disabled person's will may dissipa,te the estate
and, the will may be found invalid,

To help avoid litigation

it may be advisable for the possibly mentally retarded person
to be examined by a psychologist just prior to executing his
will. Knowing that a psychologist will testify as to the
person's competency will discourage most people from contesting the will.

Of course, except for money obtained through

inheritance and somehow not expended for care or treatment,
the mentally retarded person with a substantial estate is
rare. 202
The mentally deficient person may sue and be sued in
civil cases for most torts..

He may not be sued for torts

. .
.
t • 203
requiring
ma l'ice or inten

Even if it is deemed incongruous to hold an insane
person liable in damages for an injury inflicted by
an act which his infirmity rendered impossible to
restriin, it is reasonable to hold the insane person
liable under the principle that when one of two innocent persons must suffer a ~8~s, it should be borne
by the one who occasioned it.
Unless the mentally retarded person has been adjudged
incompetent or placed under

a guardianship, he may sue or be

202 Kin
. d re d et a.,
1
supra.
203 Asch, supra.
204

41 Am.Jur. 2d, Incompetent Persons §104. Rochester,
New York: Lawyer's Cooperative Publishing Co., 1967.

89
sued in his own name. 205

If e;l.ther of the above has occurred

the mentally deficient may sue or be sued through his guardian.
If he is incompetent to bring or defend an action, a guardian
will be appointed ad litem (for the sole purpose of bringing
206
or defending the action1.
The mentally deficient person may bring an action or
defend one but be unable to testify in his own behalf at trial
if he is of unsound mind. 207 Those mental defeo.<ta._ which interfere with the ability to perceive and communicate disqualify
a witness as being incompetent to testify •
A person who has been committed to a

state institution

for the mentally deficient and found mentally retarded cannot

• a d river
'
I
o b tain
s l'icense. 208

Even if he has not been com-

mitted or found mentally deficient, he may be denied, a driver's
license if the Oregon Motor Vehicle Division determines that
the person is suffering from mental disability which prohibits his operation of a motor vehicle or his understanding of highway si9ns.

205
206
207

209

Id.

oRS 13,051.
oRS 44.030.

2 08ons 482~120(2}.
209 oRS 482.130.

90

Under Oregon Motor Vehicle Division regulations, persons
applying far a driver's license must take a written examination
and demonstrate to an examiner competency to operate a motor
vehicle.

If the person appears to the division "to be affected

with or suffering from any physical or mental disability or
disease which might affect his operation of a motor vehicle,"
the applicant may 1) be required to demonstrate personally
that notwithstanding such disease or defect he is a proper
person to operate a motor vehicle, 2) be required to submit
to an examination by the State Health Officer who reports to
the division the results of the examination, 3) have his
physician send a rep:oart to the State Health Officer and 4)
be examined by a specialist designated by the division.

µo

The major difficulty with the statutes and accompanying
regulations is that they leave to the discretion of state
employees in the Motor Vehicle Division whether or not the
person appears to be suffering a mental disability.

As a

consequence a person whom a psychologist might find only
a borderline retarded,fully competent to drive an automobile,
may be required to obtain various reports and submit to various
examinations not required by other applicants.
210

ORS 482.240.
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RESTRICTIONS ON )?ERSONAL RlGHTS AND FA.MILY LIFE
The mentally deficient person may also have restrictions
placed upon his personal rights and family life by being
sterilized, having his marriage annuled, and having his children adopted against his will.

With the discovery of the vas-

ectomy as a relatively safe method o;f sterilization in the
1920's statutes authorizing
many states. 211

sterilization were adopted in

Challenges to the constitutionality of the

statutes were rejected, 212 and they continue to exist in most
states.213

Under Oregon law a mentally dificient person may

be sterilized to prevent procreation.

214

He is entitled to

a hearing where he may be represented by an attorney.
211 Brackel & Roc k , supra.
212suck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200 (1927) (A mentally deficint 18 year old woman who was the daughter of a mentally deficient mother and who had a mentally deficient child herself
unsuccessfully challenged a statute under which a judge ordered her sterilized. In holding that the statute did not violate
the woman's right to due process as guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment of the united States Constitution, Justice
Holmes stated, nthree gene:i:;ations of imbeciles are enough."
213

Brackel & Rock, supra.

214oRS 436.050, 436.070. Cook v. Sta,te, 9 Or.App. 224,
495 P.2d 768 (1972) (Evidence that 17 year old girl had a
history of severe emotional disturbance, .indiscriminate and
impulsive sexual involvements while in state hospital, and
brain damage making her condition unstable despite medication
supported determination that sterilization was warranted.)
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From 1940 to 1960 Oregon was one of the six states that
averaged more than 15 sterilizatj:.ons pe;i:- year.

In most states

except for North Carolina which involuntarily sterilized 240
people in 1963 alone, the number of mentally deficient sterilized were much lower. 215 Today the number of involuntary
sterilizations in Oregon and other states are even lower.
However so-called "voluntary" sterilization as a condition
for release from an institution or to avoid being sent there
in the first place is more frequent. 216 Sterilization of
person who are receiving benefits under federally funded
programs is not permitted unless the sterilization is
voluntary. 217
The propriety of using sterilization as a means of
reducing the number of mentally deficient persons has been
challenged on the grounds that heredity is not the primary
cause of mental deficiency.

Birth injuries and thyroid

deficiencies may also cause mental deficiency. 218

Requiring

states to furnish sex education and access to contraceptive
devices to all of its ci.tizens has been .suggested as a
215 arackel & Rock, supra.
216 Kindred et a.l., supra..
21 7Relf and Human Rights Organization v~ Matthews,
403 F.Supp. 1234 (D.D.C 1975}.
218Brackel & Rock, supra. See also the etiology of mental retardation discussed in Chapter II.
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alternative to statutes permitting involuntary sterilization
and reducing the number o;f "voluntary" sterilizations. 219
A mentally deficient person
annuled.

may have his marriage

Procedurally, an action to have the marriage annuled

is brought by the filing of a petition for annulment on the
ground that one or both of the parties was incapable of making
the contract or consenting to it "for want of legal age or
sufficient understanding.n 220

The marriage then becomes void

when it is declared void by the court. 221

To warrant an

annulment there must be insufficient mental capacity to
comprehend the nature and consequences of the business in
which the party was engaged, as required in other contracts. 222
It has been suggested that if a state wishes to enforce
its prohibition against the marriage of the mentally deficient,
219 Kindred et al., supra. It is questionable whether
the agreed sterilization of a person desiring federal or
state aid or to avoid institutionalization is in fact
"voluntary," since it is agreed to under what could amount
to duress or may not be agreed to by the parent or guardian
of the person and not the person himself,
220 oRS 107,105(1)~
221
oRS 106.030.
222

coleman v. Coleman, BS

or.

99, 166 P. 47 (1917).
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it should use something other than annulment, such as check.:..
ing applications for a marriage license against a central
record for all incompetent or hospitalized persons or requiring a physician's statement~ 23

Under the current

system mentally retarded persons in similar circumstances
may be treated unequally, and the annulment, which may not
be granted until several years after the marriage, always
occurs after the fact.

Others have suggested that in our

prese~t state of knowledge, there is no data to justify

application of a different rule to mentally deficient persons.
The risk of marriage ending in failure is applicable to all
persons, mentally deficient or not. 224
In Oregon the child of a mentally deficient person may
be adopted by another even though the mentally deficient
person does not consent to the adoption~ 2 ~

Procedurally,

any person seeking to adopt a child petitions the court for
an adoption order. 226 If a natural parent has been found
incompetent as discussed above and remains so at the time of
223

Brackel & Rock.
2-24

Kindred et al., supra.
225
ORS 109.322.
226

ORS 109.310.
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the adoption proceedings, a c;i,tation is served upon his
guardian if he has one.

The citation orders him to appear

in court at a certain time to show cause why the adoption
of the child should not be decreed.

A hearing is held and

if the court finds that the "wel;fare of the child will be
best promoted through the adoption of the child," the adoption will be decreed even though the mentally ilL.or mentally
deficient person objects to the adoption.

If the natural

parent has not been adjudged mentally ill or deficient, no
adoption will be decreed without his consent.

Consequently

where one of the parents is mentally ill or mentally deficient,
but has not been decreed by a court to be so, and the parent
does not consent to his child•s adoption, the prospective
adoptive parent must bring an action to have the parent
decreed incompetent because of mental illness or deficiency
before proceeding.
The rule permitting adoption of a mentally deficient
parent's child without his consent has been criticized. There
is no data to supvort a general finding that retarded parents
226
are bad parents,
Intellectual retardation is just one of the reasons
for personal incompetence within the areas of family
life and child-rearing, but is one of the high-risk
groups in which the incompetence tends to persist
over long periods of time. When one looks around
226

Kindred et al., supra.

and sees the number of children who are under the
care of non-retarded persons who are incompetent
to the task, living in squalor, ignorance and suffering, one wonders whether the principle outlined
here for dealing with the l2!?tarded do not apply
2.
equally as well to us all •
Traditional views of what is proper parental behavior to meet
.
.
'228
.
t h e b est interests
o f the c h'ild may be inappropriate.

The.noninstitutionalized mentally retarded have some
protection in employment and utilization of public accommodation and amusement in Oregon.229

For example, it is unlaw-

ful to refuse to hire a person because he has a mental handicap unless it prevents the performance of the work involvedf 30
The federal government has an tnteragency Committee on
Handicapped Employees to encourage employment of mentally
disabled persons in federal agencies or federally funded
.

231

pro)ects.

Some have suggested that the federal government

227

Brackel & Rock, supra.
228

Batt,J., Child Custody Disputes: A Developmental
Psychological Approach to Proof and Decisionmaking, Willamette
Law Journal, 1976, 12, 491.
229

ORS 659.352, 659.425.
23,0

ORS 659.425(1).
231
29 USC

§

791.
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insure the economic security of the mentally retarded by
.
. 232 h .
.
.
.
h
making direct payments to them;
owever, it is per aps
of equal importance that a person experience well be.img from
having a meaningful, satisfying job with opportunities for
training and advancement.

233

In Oregon mentally retarded children must be provided
special education. 234

However since placement in a special

class or schools carries a stigma

235

courts have held that

procedural safeguards of notice and hearing to determine
that the educational placement will benefit rather than harm
the child must be satisfied. 236
232 Kindred et al., supra.
233 Farber ,B., Mental Retardation, Its Social Context a·nd
Social Consequences, Boston: Houghton, Mifflin Co., 1968.
234
oRS 343.221. Education is the principal method for
the mentally retarded to achieve habilitation (defined in
Chapter II). There is a growing body of litigation and
legislation concerning education for the mentally retarded.
Except for a brief review, this paper will not examine education for the mentally retarded. Court decisions have treated treatment and education separately despite their close
relationship.
235
Kindred et al., supra.
236
Pennsylvania Association for :Retarded Children v.
Pennsylvania, 343 F,Supp. 279 (E.D. Pa. 1972).
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Preference must be given to placement in the regular classroom
with appropriate ancillary services rather than placement in
238
237
a special class.
In Lar·ry P. v. Riles,
the court held
that students wrongfully placed in classes for the mentally
retarded were irreparably harmed.

Consequently the school

had to show that its placement based on I.Q. test scores was
rationally related to the purpose of segregating students
according to their ability to learn.

It has been suggested

that the school have the affirmative duty of notifying parents
1) of the specific learning problem, 2) the reasons for the
determination that the child cannot be successfully served
in the regular classroom, 3) the results of any medical,
psychological and educational assessment of the child, and
4) the specific educational plan for the child.

Periodic

review of the child's progress should be given to the parents.
If the parents believe the classification is erroneous, they
should be entitled to a hearing. 239

The Oregon Department

of Education has promulgated rules requiring notice to parents,
237 Mills Vt Boa.rd of Education for the District of
Columbia, 348 F.Supp. 866 (D.D.c. 1972),
238343 F.Supp. 1306 (N.D. Cal., 1972).
239 Kindred et al., supra.
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a hearing, and representation by an attorney to satisfy the requirements suggested by the courts. 240

This kind of individ-

ual analysis with its concurrent program designed to meet the
specific needs of the child could be provided every child.
SU.MM.ARY

As this chapter indicates, the law imposes a considerable influence on the lives of the mentally retarded whether
institutionalized or not.

In addition to commitment, the

mentally retarded may have his personal decisions delegated
to an appointed guardian or conservator, his contracts
voided, his will disregarded, his marriage annuled and his
children adopted against his will.
long history.

All restrictions have a

Recently legislatures have adopted statutes

requiring that certain procedures be followed before these
restrictions may be imposed, particularly for involuntary
commitment and in criminal law proceedings.
Throughout its long history of involvement, the law
has been concerned with restricting the mentally retarded
for the protection of the mentally retarded and society.
But there

h~s

been no legal provision

~or

providing the men-

a;lly retarded ·with conco!Tllf1i tant treatment so the restrictions
240
OAR 581-15-025.
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may be removed or at

le~st

alleviated,

Prohibitions against

discrimination in employment and the right of children to
special education have been recent statutory developments
which show a growing concern for the rights of the mentally
retarded.
Recent legislation and judicial opinions have indicated
a right to treatment/habilitation for the institutionalized.
The legal arguments for the right as raised by disgruntled
patients or their guardians in litigation based on constitutional and statutory provisions are numerous.

There is no

national consensus by the courts, however, on the legal basis
for a mentally retarded person's right to treatment or even
if such a right exists.

In the following chapter, an analysis

of the right to treatment and its appropriateness for judicial
review will illustrate the current status of the right to
treatment for the habilitation of the committed mentally
retarded.

The law's deprivation of the liberty of the

mentally retarded who have not been committed to a mental
health facility would suggest that treatment or habilitation
should be afforded them as well.
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CHAPTER IV
THE RIGHT TO TREATMENT
The right to treatment as that term is used by legal
writers and judges is in reality a right to habilitation.
Habilitation has been definded as:
the process by which the staff of the institution
assists the resident to acquire and maintain those
life skills which enable him to cope more effectively
with the demands of his own person and of his environment and to raise the level of this physical, mental,
and social efficiency. Habilitation includes but is
not limited to programs of formal, structured education and treatment.241
In the law, especially judicial opinions, there must be more
than a theoretical right to habilitation.

There must be some

legal basis for the right or it will not be enforced.

Further-

more, merely the existence of a. legal ba,sis for treatment is
not enough to activate judicial involvement.
must be

justiciable-~capa,ble

The controversy

of judicial review.

Once those

two preliminary requirements have been satisfied courts are
241 wyatt v. Stickney, 344 F.Supp. 387, 395 (M.D. Ala. N.D.
1972). See Chapter II for a discussion of the normalization
principle which is generally used by psychologists rather
than habilitation which is used by the courts.
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then in a position to evaluate: the adequacy of the treatment

afforded,
BASES FOR THE RIGHT
There are several legal bases justifying the right to
treatment: 1) the Fourteenth Amendment; 2) the Eighth Amendment; 3) the Thirteenth Amendment; 3} statutes such as the
Federal Civil Rights Act; and 4) a state's liability to the
mentally retarded for money damages in negligently failing
to provide treatment or in breaching its agreement to provide
treatment.
Fourteenth Amendment
One basis for treatment recogn;ized by the court in
Wyatt

242 · d
·
is ue process and eg:ua 1 protec t'ion as provJ.'d e d in

the Fourteenth Amendment;
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall
ab;ridg.e the privileges or immunities of citizens of
the United States; nor shall any State deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property without due
process of law; nor deny to any person within i3-s
jurisdiction the equal protection of the law, 2
242

yvya.tt v. Stickney, 344 F,Supp. 373 (M.D. Ala. N.D.
1972) aff'd sub. nom. -yryatt v, Aderholt, 503 F.2d 1305 (5th
Circ, 1974). See also James v,.. Wa.lTace, 406 F.Supp. 318 (M,D.
A.la. 19761; welsh v~ Likens, 373 F.Supp. 487 CD.Minn., 1974);
Davis v. Watkins, 384 F.Supp. 1196 (N,D. Oh. 1974); But see
Donaldson v. O'Connor, 422 U.S. 957 (1975).
243
U.S. Const., amend. XIV.
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The amendment does not specifically provide for treatment nor
even mention the mentally retarded.
which have been decided in

various

The courts in decisions
244
contexts
have held

that the Fourteenth Amendment requires that the mentally
retarded receive treatment.

Essentially the amendment re-

quires that no state deprive any person of life, liberty
or property without due process of law.

Courts have held

that due process may be divided into procedural due process
and substantive due process.

Procedural due process requires

that certain formalities such as a hearing before a judge,
testimony by witnesses with the opportunity for the opposing
side to cross-examine the witnesses and representation by an
attorney at all significant stages of the proceeding, be
complied with before any person be deprived of life, liberty
or p~operty~ 45

Substantive due process requires that no

person be deprived of his life, liberty or property for
arbitrary reasons.

There must be a legitimate state interest

which applies even-handedly to all affected persons, 246

and

24

\.he mentally retarded may join with others similarly
situated in bringing a class action or as an individual acting directly or through a guardian. The action may be for
money damages, for an injunction to obtain a court order requiring treatment or seeking release from the mental health
facility under a writ of habeas corpus.
245

In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1966); Bart.ley v. Kremens,

supra.
246

16 Am:. Jur. 2d, Constitutional Law § 550 (1964).
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a reasonable relationship between the deprivation and the
person. 247
Procedural due process
Application of the Fourteenth .Amendment was historically restricted by the courts to adult defendants in criminal
actions.

Courts ruled that due process required a prompt

hearing before a judge and representation of the accused by
an attorney at all significant stages of the proceedings. 248
Procedural due process requirements were subsequently extended to include juvenile offenders. 249 The courts reasoned
that since the criminal defendant, whether adult or juvenile,
faced a deprivation of liberty, due process required that the
accused's liberty not be taken away without a fair hearing.
Recent cases have extended procedural due process requirements to the mentally retarded who are faced with involuntary commitment to a state mental health facility.

In

Heryford v. Parker, 396 F.2d 393 (10th Circ. 1968) the
247 Halpern C.R., The Right to Habilitation, in Kindred
1
et al., supra.
248Gideon v. Wa,inwrig-ht, 372 U.S, 335 (1963} (Criminally
accused felon has a right to be represented by an attorney at
all significant stages of criminal proceedings); :Argersinger v.
Hamlin, 407 u.s. 25 (1972) (Right to Counsel must be exercised whenever any form of imprisonment may be imposed.)
249rn re Gault, supra.
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court held that a mentally deficient person was entitled to
be represented by an attorney at commitment proceedings and
to confront witnesses.

Parker was committed in 1946 when he

was nine at the request of his mother.

He remained there

continually until 1963 when he was released to the custody of
his parents.

Against the wishes of both Parker and his par-

ents, Parker was returned to the training school for the mentally deficient in Wyoming in 1965.
1968.

He remained there until

At the time of the initial commitment in 1946 the

state was represented by the county prosecuting attorney and
a hearing was held where the prosecuting attorney, the certifying psychologist and the mother were all present.
was Parker represented by an attorney.

At no time

In holding that

Parker's due process rights were violated by his lack of
representation by an attorney the court stated:
It matters not whether the proceedings be labeled
"civil 11 or "criminal" or whether the subject matter
be mental instability or juvenile delinquency.
It
is the likelihood of involuntary incarceration-whether for punishment as an adult for a crime, rehabilitation as a juvenile for delinquency, or treatment and training as a feeble-minded or mental
incompetent--which commands observance of the constitutional safeguards of due process. 2 5 o
In !'artley

v.

Krentens

251

the federal court held that

the Pennsylvania Mental Health and Mental Retardation Act of
250
396 F.2d at 396.
251
402 F.Supp. 1039,supra.
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1966 and reg-ulations developed by the Mental Health Depart-

ment, which set out procedural requirements for the voluntary
admission of minors, were unconstitutional.

The three judge

court determined that the due process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment required that minors who were "voluntarily" committed to mental health facilities were entitled to: 1) a
probable cause hearing prior to commitment; 2) a post-commitment hearing; 3) written notice of all hearings; 4) representation by an attorney at all significant stages of commitment;
5) personal presence at all hearings; 6) commitment only upon

a finding by clear and convincing proof of need for institutionalization; and 7) the right to confront and cross-examine
witnesses and to offer testimony of witnesses. 252
Ba;rtley was appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court. On
May 16, 1977 the Supreme Court vacated the lower court's
decision and remanded the case for further hearings because
of the changes in Pennsylvania statutes and regulations since
the time of the lower court trial. Despite the Supreme Court's
refusal to act, the initial opinion shows the extension of
procedural due process in the commitment of the mentally
retarded.

Legislatures, aware of the va;rious court decisions,

have provided for certain procedures before commitment.

In

Oregon, however, these procedures are restricted principally
252

Id.
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to the mentally ill.

253

Substantive Due: Proce:ss
Courts have now held that under substantive due process
. .

.

the mentally retarded have a right to treatment.

254

The court

in Wyatt v. Stickney forged a two pronged theory based on the
Fourteenth Amendment: 1) the parens patriae concept and 2)
the quid pro quo concept.

Under the parens patriae concept

the State has sovereign power over its disabled citizens
including the mentally retarded to act as a parent in making
253

oRS Chapt. 427 provides that after a petition for
commitment is filed by any person, the mentally retarded appear before a judge who may order a pre-commitment examination
followed by another hearing and commitment if he is mentally
deficient and in need of care, custody or training, ORS 427.
015 et seq. He is informed of his right to an attorney, but
nothing need be done to secure one for him. ORS 427.062.
The statutes governing involuntary commitment of the mentally
ill contain many more procedural requirements than do those
concerning the mentally retarded. Kirkpatrick, L.C., Oregon's
New Mental Commitment Statute: The Expanded Responsibilities
of Courts and Counsel, Oregon Law Review, 1974, 53, 245.
Senate Bill 79 was introduced in the 1977 Oregon'"Legislature
in an attempt to provide more procedural safeguards for the
mentally retarded. There are no procedural safeguards for
''voluntary admission" of the mentally retarded or minors.
While the proposed senate bill has no procedural safeguards
for voluntary admission of minors, such legislation m~y be
P,roposed regardless of the final decision in Bartley. Unfortunately this bill did not get out of committee for action
on the legislative floor~
254

Wyatt v. Stickney, supra; Welsh v. Likens, supra.
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decisions for them which they a,re unable to make for themselves,

Consequently the State may deprive the mentally re-

tarded of his liberty by confining him in a mental health
facility or, as discussed earlier, may require appointment of
a guardian or conservator or declare the person incompetent.
Under the quid pro quo concept when the state takes away the
mentally retarded's liberty, it must offer something in return.
The "something" is treatment, reasonably designed to alleviate
the need for continued loss of liberty.

255

Based on this two

pronged theory the court in Wyatt held that substantive due
process under the Fourteenth Amendment requires that a mentally retarded person committed to a state mental health facility

must recieve treatment.

The court reasoned: 1) civil

commitment curtails individual liberty; 2) loss of liberty is
predicated on a need for treatment; 3) the mentally retarded
will be released when he is able to care for himself; 4) due
process requires that he be given
cured.

a

reasonable chance to be

256

255

yvyatt v, Stickney~ su}?rai See Martella v. Kelly,
359 f.Supp. (S.D, N,Y. 191731 (Effect,j,ve t,::eatment must be
the quid pro guo for society's right to exercise control over
civilly committed children,)
256

comment: Wyatt v. Stickney and the right of Civilly
Committed Mental Patients to A.dequate Treatment, Harvard Law
Review, 197 3, 86, 1282.
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In
health

~ya,:t'J:

fac;i~ity

a group of Alaba.ma employees in a state mental
b;rom;J'ht a class action challenging a state

decision to terminate their employment because of budgetary
cutbacks.

The guardians of the mentally ill at the facility

and finally the guardians of the mentally retarded at other
facilities joined the class action as plaintiffs.

They

challenged the treatment, or lack of it, which the mentally
disabled were receiving at state mental health facilities.
District Court Judge Johnson heard testimony from many mental
health professionals and from hospital and staff members.

He

ultimately concluded that under the Fourteenth Amendment the
mentally deficient were entitled to adequate treatment.

The

defendant administrators of the state facilities in Alabama
and Governor George Wallace appealed to the Fifth Circuit.
However the Court of Appeals affirmed the district judge's
decision and held that civilly committed mental patients
have a constitutional right to receive such individual treatment as will help each of them to be cured or improve his or
her mental condition,

The court also affirmed the district

court order that the defendants implement an elaborate set
of standards of treatment, establish human rights committees at the institutions and prepare and file reports within six months concerning the implementation of the standards
of treatment ordered by the court. 257
257

Wyatt v. Aderholt, supra.
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Equal Protection
Equal protection requires that all persons be treated
alike under similar circumstances both in privileges conferred
. b'l'
.
d • 258
an d 1 ia
i ity impose

Courts must scrutinize classif ica-

tions of citizens to assure that the classifications are
reasonable where fundamental rights are affected.

The govern-

ment must show a substantial and compelling reason for the
c 1 assi'f'l.ca t'ion. 259
The equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment by itself and in conjuction with the due process clause
has been used as a basis for treatment.
258

260

In Nason the

16 Am.Jur. 2d, Constitutional Law § 488.

259 Halpern, supra, p. 393. Se also Chambers, Alternatives to Civil Commitment of the Mentally Ill--Practical
Guides and Constitutional Imperatives, Michigan Law Review,
1972, 2.Q_, 1107.
260 Nason
.
.
d ent o f Brr'd gewater State Hospit.
v. Su erlnten
al, 233 N_E. 2a· O
Mass!
9
Nason, c arge w t
mur er,
was found incompetent to stand trial ~nd was committed to
the Bridgewater Hospital in Massachusetts, On petition for
release he urged that the hospital was understaffed and that
treatment was so inferior to other hospitals in the state that
his confinement there denied him equal protection of the law.
The Massachusetts Supreme Court held that Nason's confinement
did not satisfy the promise of treatment and the lack of treatment created substantial risk of violating the equal protection clause.
If adequate efforts were not made to improve
Nason's condition within a reasonable period, the legality of
Nason's further confinement was questionable.)
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Supreme Court of Massachusetts held:

If ... treatment is not available on a reasonable,
nondiscrimina.troy basis, there is a substantial
risk that constitutional requirements of equal
protection of the laws will not be satisfied.
Differences in treatment may be justified by
differences in particular cases, but should be 261
reasonably related to the varying circumstances.
·
Reliance upon the equal protection clause has been criticized
in that instead of requiring all staffs in a given state to
meet the standards of the best hospital, it only requires
equality among all.

This penalizes those states which have

made some progress and leaves unchanged uniformly poor con. .
.
d itions
in
oth er states. 262

This criticism, however, ignores

the possible broader spectrum of the court's ruling which
would require that the mentally ill or mentally deficient
receive the same quality of treatment as persons suffering
from physical ailments or the same as mentally deficient persons in private facilities. 2 6 3
261
Id.
262
Goodman,S.M., Right to Treatment: The Responsibility
of the Courts, The Georgetown Law Journal, 1969, 57, 680,
690-691.
263
Murdock, c.w., Civil Rights of the Mentally Retarded:
Some Critical Issues, Notre Dame Lawyer, 1972, 48, 133, 160.
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Eighth Amendment
Another

constitutional basis for

treatment is the pro-

hibition of the Eighth Amendment against cruel and unusual
punishment:
Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive
fines impo~~~, nor cruel and unusual punishments
inflicted.
Courts have traditionally restricted its application to criminal defendants.

In Wyatt, however, the court held that

since confinement of a mentally ill or mentally retarded
person deprives him of liberty until he is "cured", failure
to provide necessary treatment so that the person be released constitutes cruel and unusual punishment.

Application of

the Eighth Amendment was used to require treatment in a
recent California case, People v. Feagley.

265

In Feagley

the defendant was convicted of simple battery as the result
of stroking the hair and necks of two young girls.

The

crime was a misdemeanor punishable by 30 days of imprisonment.

However because Feagley had engaged in similar activ-

ities in the past he was also convicted for violation of
California's sexual offender statute.

As a consequence he

was sentenced to a special colony for sexual of fenders at
264

265
(1975}.

U.S. Const. amend. VIII.

14 Cal.3d 338, 121 Cal.Rptr. 509, 535 P.2d 373
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the state penitentiary.

He received no psychiatric treat-

ment and sought release under a writ of habeas corpus.

266

The California court held that Feagley's incarceration without adequate treatment constituted cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment.

267

Feagley was

a convicted prisoner, but the Wyatt court recognized that
the mentally disabled, including the mentally retarded, are
in effect punished for being mentally ill or retarded and
given indefinite sentences until "cured".

Failure to pro-

vide treatment so that the "sentence" may be ended and liberty restored is cruel and unusual punishment.
266

writ of habeas corpus--called the great writ, means
literally "let us have the body 9 •
It is frequently used by
prisoners and civilly committed mentally ill and mentally
retarded to obtain release from confinement on the grounds
that they are being wrongfully held.

v

267 People v. Feagley, supra. Comment: The Eighth
Amendment Right to Treatment for Involuntarily Committed
Mental Patients, Iowa Law Review, 1976, 61, 1057. In its
ruling in Feagley, the court relied in part on Robinson v.
California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962) (Defendant was arrested after
police officers observed needle marks on his arm and was
convicted of drug addiction. The court held that drug
addiction is a status as is mental illness. The imposition
of punishment for a status violates the Eighth Amendment.)
But see Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514 (1968) (Defendant was
arrested for public intoxication and his conviction was
affirmed, despite the fact he was an alcoholic, on the
grounds that he could have avoided the criminal .act by
drinking at home. Therefore he was convicted for the prohibited act of drunkeness and not his status of being an
alcoholic. )
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Thirteenth Amendment

Another constitutional basis for treatment, although
somewhat limited, is the Thirteenth Amendment.
Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except
as a punishment for crime whereof the party shall
have been duly c~g~icted, shall exist within the
United States ••.
Although the immediate aim of the amendment was the abolition
of slavery, the amendment has been construed by the courts to
require maintenance of a free and voluntary labor force. 269
A recent case held that if a mentally retarded person can
prove 1) that he was required to perform work involuntarily
because of his mental condition and 2) the chores had no
therapeutic prupose, but were performed solely to assist in
defraying institutional costs, he may establish violation of
the Thirteenth Arnendment. 270

The defendants argued that

all involuntary civil commitment serves a compelling state
interest in protecting society from the mentally retarded so
that the question of whether or not the work was therapeutic
was irrelevant.

Their argument was rejected.

268 U.S. Const. amend. XIII.
269

Po 1 lac k v. Wi·11·iams, 322 U.S. 4 (1944) .

270 weidenfeller v. Kidulis, 380 F.Supp. 445 (E.D. Wis.
197 4) •
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While the decision in Weidenfeller does not hold that
the Thirteenth Amendment specifically requires treatment for
the mentally retarded, it does establish that the mentally
retarded must not be compelled to perform work that is nontherapeutic.

Limitations on what kinds of work activities

patients of mental heal.th facilities may be required to perform have been imposed in several decisions which have re271
quired minimum treatment.
Statutory Bases
A fourth basis for treatment is statutory, including
1) state statutes specifically requiring treatment for the
272
institutionalized mentally retarded;
2) the Federal
273
Civil Rights Act;
and.3) the Developmentally Disabled
271

see Davis v. Watkins, 384 F.Supp. 1196, 1208-1209
(N.D. Oh. W.D., 1974) (Patients not required under any circumstances to perform "[r]epetitiye, non-functienal, degr.ading,
and unnecessary tasks ... such as buffing a waxed floor that
has already been sufficiently buffed, polishing brass, or
shining employee's shoes."
272 1964 Hospitalization of the Mentally Ill Act,
D.C. Code §21-562 (Supp,V., 1966) See Rouse v. Cameron,
125 U.S. App. D.C. 366, 373 F.2d 451 (1966).
27 342 USC §1981 (1871).
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Assistance and Bill of Rights Act. 274
Rouse v. Cameron, one of the earliest cases to deal
with the right to adequate treatment, suggested that there
might be a constitutional basis for treatment as discussed
earlier.

The court's finding for the plaintiff however was

specifically based on a District of Columbia statute:
A person hospitalized in a public hospital for a
mental illness shall, during his hospitalization,
be entitled to medical and psychiatric care and
treatment. The administrator of each public
hospital shall keep records detailing all medi~~~
and psychiatric care and treatment received ••.
Rouse was charged with a misdemeanor and found not
guilty by reason of insanity and committed.
the crime was one year.

Punishment for

Rouse had been institutionalized

for four years, and sought release under a writ of habeas
corpus because he contended he was not receiving adequate
treatment.

The trial judge refused to consider the question

of adequate treatment stating that he could decide whether
his treatment was adequate.

The lower court trial judge

dismissed Rouse's request for release.

The appellate court,

in an opinion by Judge David Bazelon, reversed the lower
court's action and remanded the case to the trial judge to
hear expert testimony and determine whether or not Rouse's
treatment was adequate.
274
275

42USC §6001 (1975) •
Rouse v. Cameron, supra; D.C. Code §21-562, supra.
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As discussed earlier, Oregon statutes provide that a
person found not guilty of a crime by reason of a mental
disease or defect may be committed if he needs care, super276
vision or treatment,
or in the case of the mentally
277
. .
Unlike the Washingretar d e d --care, custod y or training.
ton D.C. statute, treatment is not specified for the mentally
retarded.

278

However it appears implicit that the committed

mentally retarded have a right to treatment since 1) they
will not be released until ''cured" or no longer in need of
care, custody or training,

and 2) courts have indicated that

mere custodial care is insufficient.

There are no Oregon

cases on point, and unfortunately for the committed mentally
retarded person seeking treatment, the Oregon statutes are
not as explicit in requiring treatment as are those of the
District of Columbia.
276
277
278

ORS 161. 340.
ORS 427.015.

A mentally ill person in Oregon has a statutory
right to have a written treatment plan. ORS 426.385(g).
The mentally retarded lack such statutory protection.
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A second statutory basis for treatment is the Federal
Civil Rights Act of 1871, which provides:
Every person who under color of any statute •.• of
any State ••. subjects, or causes to be subjected
any citizen of the United States or other person
within the jurisdiction, thereof, to the deprivation
of any rights, privileges or inununities secured by th2
Constitution, shall be liable to the party injured ••. 79
The statute is essentially a codification of the Fourteenth
Amendment.

It is important to the mentally retarded seeking

treatment because it specifies that if the mentally retarded
is denied treatment and can convince the court that he had a
statutory right to treatment he may receive money damages.
Plaintiff in Donaldson v. O'Connor

280

sought money damages

under the Civil Rights Act from two physicians at a mental
health facility for their failure to either provide treatment or release him.

Donaldson had been confined in a Florida

State Hospital for the mentally ill against his will for
nearly 15 years and had repeatedly demanded release claiming
he was dangerous to no one and at any rate was receiving no
treatment.

At numerous times friends and once a halfway house

agreed to provide Donaldson any care he might require, but
he was not released and continued receiving only custodial
care. At the trial the trial judge instructed the
279 42USC §1983.
280 see Annot. Right to Relief Under Federal Civil
Rights Act of 1871 for Alleged Wrongful Conunitment to or
Confinement in Mental Hospital. American Law Reports Federal,
1973, 16, 440.
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jury that O'Connor violated Donaldson's civil rights under
the statute if Donaldson was eonfined against his will, was
not dangerous to himself or others and was not receiving
treatment.
$48,500.

The jury awarded Donaldson money damages totalling
O'Connor appealed to the Fifth Circuit of Appeals

which affirmed the judgment and held thata .. person confined
ag~inst

his will in a state mental insitution has a "constit-

utional right to receive such treatment as will give him a
reasonable opportunity to be cured or improve his mental
con d 1' t 'ion. i,281
The U.S. Supreme Court essentially affirmed the judgment of the jury at the trial leve1282 but vacated the broad
sweeping opinion of the appellate court and simply held that
a state cannot

constitutionally confine a nondangerous person

28·1

393 F.2d 507, 520.
2.82
O'Connor argued that he was not liable for money
damages because he was acting in good faith in reliance on
state law. The trial judge instructed the jury that O'Connor
would not be liable if he believed in good faith that Donaldson's continued confinement was proper. The Supreme Court
remanded the case to the Court of Appeals to decide whether
the instruction effectively informed the jury that O'Connor
would only be liable under the civil rights act if he knew
or should have known that the action he took within his sphere
of official responsibilities, would violate Donaldson's
constititutional rights or if he took action with the malicious intent of violating Donaldson's civil rights.
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capable of living in freedom by himse·lf or with the help of
family and friends.

Since the jury found that O'Connor

knowingly confined Donaldson, its judgment was affirmed.
The court sidestepped the issue, however, of whether there
was a constitutional right to treatment.
Specifically, there is no reason now to decide whether
mentally ill persons dangerous to themselves or others
have a right to treatment upon compulsory confinement
by the State, or whether the State may compulsorily
confine a nondangerous, m~~gally ill individual for
the purpose of treatment.
As a result of the Donaldson case, there is no Supreme Court
authority that there is a constitutional right to treatment,
nor conversely is there Supreme Court authority that there
is no constitutional right to treatment. · Donaldson does
stand for the proposition that the mentally retarded or mentally ill person who believes that his constitutional right
to treatment is violated may raise the issue by seeking money
damages under the Federal Civil Rights Act.

As a result of

the Supreme Court's ruling in Donaldson, cases such as Wyatt
are still viable rules of law in the jurisdictions involved
and may be persuasive authority in other jurisdictions such
as Oregon for the proposition that there is a constitutional
right to treatment, but the decisions would not be binding
on Oregon courts as a ruling by the U.S. Supreme Court would
have been.
283

422 U.S. 563, 669.
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Another statutory basis for treatment is the Develop284
mentally Disabled Assistance and Bill of Rights Act.
Essentially the Act provides that in order for a state to
receive part of the 50 millia.n dollars allocated to construction, remodeling or alteration of facilities for the
developmentally disabled, the state must provide the federal
government with satisfactory assurances that it has implemented
a habilitati6n plan for each mentally disabled person, setting forth the objectives and manner of achievement as well
as a provision for an annual review of each treatment plan.
In addition the act requires that the Secretary of Health,
Education and Welfare promulgate regulations setting forth
the kinds of services needed by the developmentally disabled
and standards as to the scope and quality of the services:S

5

Congress also made specific findings concerning the rights of
persons with developmental disabilities:
1) persons with developmental disabilities have a right
to appropriate treatment, services, and habilitation for such
disabilities;

284
42

use

§6001-6001.

285
42 USC §6009. The regulations have been proposed
but have not yet been adopted.
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2) the treatment, services, and habilitation for a
person with developmental disabilities should be designed
to maximi.ze the developmental potential of the person and
should be provided in the setting that is least restrictive
to the person's personal liberty.
While the United States may not bring an action to
require state facilities to comply with the act, the act does
not restrict the rights of the individual to bring an action
on his own. 28 6

In addition the act specifically requires that

States seeking funds under the act develop and maintain an
independent advocacy system to pursue legal, administrative
and other appropriate remedies to insure protection of the
rights of persons receiving treatment, services, or habilitation within the State. 287
It is impossible to predict the success of the act in
securing habilitation for the mentally retarded.

The act's

success or failure will depend upon the regulations finally
adopted and the parameters of the act as established by
administrative hearings and legal actions brought by the advocacy system required under the act as well as actions brought
by individual mentally retarded persons.
286

u.s.

287
42

v. Solomon, 419 F.Supp. 358 (D.Md. 1976).

use

§6012.
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Negligence· and Breach of contract
In addition to constitutional and statutory bases for
treatment, a mentally retarded person may have a cause of
action against the state, treating physician, psychologists,
psychiatrists or the superintendent or director of the mental
health facility for negligence in failing to provide adequate
treatment.

If successful he will be awarded money damages. ·288

In Bartlett v. New York289 plaintiff charged the state with
negligence in failing to release him from a state mental
health facility after he had been involuntarily committed
37 years earlier as having "simple or low level schizophrenia"
288
Schwitzgebel,R., The Right to Effective Mental Treatment, supra, 936. The author notes that if a patient
enters a mental hospital and does not leave or if treated
and untreated patients do equally well in the facility,
it is obvious that the patient has not been receiving proper
treatment. In medical malpractice cases, the courts use
the doctrine of res ipsa losruitur (the thing speaks for
itself) to create a presumption of negligence against the
doctor in causing injury to the patient. The defendants who
are in a better position to know must explain the reason
for the treatment given. In cases brought by the mentally
retarded for non-treatment, the mentally r.etarded person
would only need to show that his condition has hot improved
despite his commitment to a mental health facility. It
would then be incumbent upon the state or the treating
physician or psychologist to show that the mentally retarded
person had received adequate treatment but because of his
condition, treatment was of no value or as a result of the
treatment given satisfactory improvement had occurred.
289
No. 340/1976, N.Y. Supreme Court, App. Div.
(May 28, 1976).
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despite his frequent requests that he be released because
he was receiving no treatment.

the claim on

The trial court dismissed

the ground that the state hospital was exer-

cising professional judgment.

Because it was making dis-

cretionary choices concerning the type, if any, of the treat290
ment to provide the plaintiff it could not be liable.
However on appeal the appellate court reversed:
The wrong committed by refusing such release is not
the result of the exercise of a professional judgment, but of total indifference and neglect to duty.
~uch ~ond~~t removes the protection of governmental
immunity.
The appellate court remanded the case to the trial court to
determine the amount of the patient•s damages based upon the
length of time he was ready, willing and able to be released
without danger to the community.

The court did not specify

what kind of treatment the patient was entitled to receive
but only that he was entitled to treatment:
[A]lthough there may not be complete unanimity of
opinion as to what treatment to extend to the patient;
there can be no doubt that if the patient is detained
because of m~~2al illness, some treatment must be

offered him.
290 .
Originally the State and its employees could not be
sued because of governmental or sovereign immunity. Most
states including Oregon and the federal government have now
passed tort claims acts which permit the government and its
employees to be sued. However the State and its employees
are not liable for discretionary decisions involving matters
of policy nor for matters of professional judgment. ORS 30.150.

291
292

Bartlett v. New York, supra.

Id.
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While Bartlett involved a mentally ill patient, the
court's ruling would be equally applicable to a mentally
retarded patient.

However a difficulty pointed up by the

case is the fact that the state and its employees are not
liable for negligently making or failing to make policy
decisions or in negligently making professional judgments.
Consequently it may be difficult for the mentally retarded
person to recover from the state or its employees for his
non-treatment.

For example, in Baker v. Straumfjord,293

the Oregon Court of Appeals held that a state employed
physician at the Oregon State University infirmiry was not
liable for injuries sustained by a mentally disturbed patient
who leaped from a third floor window of the university
infirmiry.

Plaintiff alleged that as a patient he had not

been adequately restrained or supervised.

The court held

that the physician was immune from liability because his
decision concerning the care of the patient was based on
professional judgment with which the court would not interfere.
Based on Baker it is unlikely that an Oregon court
would hold the state or one of its employees liable in
damages for negligently failing to provide a patient with
29-3
10 Or.App. 414, 500 P.2d 496 (1972}.
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adequate treatment, unless the court were to have a case
before it like Bartlett
neglect to duty is shown.

in which a total indifference and
Until the court alters its

application of the discretionary function defense to professional judgment or until the Oregon Tort Claims Act is
amended by the legislature, liability for negligence is
possible but not probable as a basis for treatment in Oregon.
It has also been suggested that a patient at a mental
health facility might be entitled to recover damages when he
has not received adequate treatment, under a breach of contract theory.294

This theory has been used sparingly in

practice because there is usually no oral or written agreement between the psychologist and the patient.

The benefits

of having a contract have been outlined by Alexander and
Szasz:
[I]t seems likely that while more precise definitions
of the psychiatrist's contractual powers and limitations would curtail some of current psychiatric
practices, it would expand others, by removing the
presently justified fears of many persons to sacrifice
their autonomy and yield to the total discretion of
the psychiatrist. 295
294
Schwitzgebel, R., The Right to Effective Mental
Treatment, supra, 951.
295
Alexander & Szasz,T., From Contract to Status via
Psychiatry, Santa Clara Law Review, 1973, 13, 537, 555.
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The use of contracts for treatment would clearly define the
expectations of the patient and the obligations of the
psychologists or pyschiatrist.

The use of contracts has

been effective in a mental health clinic in Florida 2-96 and
at the Elahan Clinic in Vancouver, Washington.297

The con-

tracts specify treatment to be given and goals to be accomplished, encouraging patient participation.

They do not

however provide for money damages.
Several difficulties restrict implementation of
contracts as a basis for treatment.

First, despite the sup-

port advocated by professionals in the mental health field
such as Thomas Szasz, it is questionable whether a psychologist,
or psychiatrist would want to enter into a contract which
would limit his flexibility in treating the person or in
agreeing in advance of treatment to specific results.

Secondly,

the patient after agreeing to treatment might subsequently
refuse further treatment as he has a right to do.298

This

296
Lombilla, Kiresak & Sherman, Evaluating a Community
Mental Health Program: Contract Fulfillment Analysis,
Hospital and Community Psychiatry, 1973, 24, 760.
297
Casey,W., Director of Elahan (lecture, Portland
State University, Feb., 1977).
298
Friedman,P.R. Legal Regulations of Applied Behavior
Analysis, Mental Institutions and Prisons, Arizona Law
Review, 1975, 17, 40.
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would amount to a breach of contract by the mentally retarded
person, but the psychologist or psychiatrist might not
receive payment for any treatment already provided.
A major difficulty with the contract basis for treatment is that mentally retarded persons may be considered
incompetent to enter into a contract.

Under the common law

they are deemed incompetent persons and are protected from
contracting for services to restore their condition. 299

In

Oregon a person must have sufficient mental capacity to understand the nature of the business he is engaging in or he will
not be able to enter into a contract. 300

There would be

nothing however, to prevent a psychiatrist, psychologist,
or mental health facility from entering into a contract with
the patient's family, guardian or friends for treatment and
thereby provide a clear basis for determining the specific
rights of both the patient and the psychologist or psychiatrist.
299
Schwitzgebel,R., The Right to Effective Mental
Treatment, surpa, 953.
300
Gindhart v. Skourtes, supra. Limitations on the
mentally retarded person's right to enter into contracts is
discussed in Chapter III.
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JUSTICIABILITY OF "ADEQUATE" TREATMENT CONTROVERSY
Opponents to judicial requirements that treatment be
offered to the mentally disabled have argued that the provision of treatment in not a justiciable controversy. 301
Merely because there is a legal basis for treatment does not
mean that a court will intervene by examining whether or not
appropriate treatment has been given.

The controversy must

be appropriate for judicial scrutiny or a court will not
review it.302

In deciding whether or not the controversy

is justiciable the courts consider three basic issues: 1)
whether judicially discoverable and manageable standards exist
for determining the rights of the parties; 2) whether a
judicial determination will amount to an interference with
31!ll

Burnham v. Dept. of Public Health, 349 F.Supp. 1335
{N.D. Ga. 1972), reversed, 503 F.2d 1319 (5th Circ. 1974)
(Trial court held that it could not and should not become
involved in the right to treatment issue. The court held
that the judiciary was unable to determine what was adequate
treatment because the definitions of psychiatric treatment
were too broad. The judge was also of the opinion that there
was no constitutionally recognized right to treatment. Finally,
he determined that any attempt to ascertain the adequacy of
treatment is best left to the state courts. The judg~'s
decision was reversed on appeal to the Fifth Circuit Court
of Appeals which held that there was a constitutional right
to treatment and the adequacy was appropriate for review in
the courts whether state or federal.
302
Shuster v. Herold, 410 F.2d 1071 {2nd Circ. 1969).
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decisions by other branches of government; and 3) whether
303
th e courts can provi·d e a d equate re l 'ie f .
The defendants in Wyatt suggested that since even
experts in mental health could not agree on minimum standards, the best approach would be for courts to defer to the
judgment of involved professionals.

They also argued that

the establishment of policing of individual treatment plans
should not be undertaken by a court and that a court could
not choose among the vast array of psychotherapies.

As they

observed, the proper therapy or habilitation plan for one
patient might be contraindicated by another.

Defendant

Governor George Wallace of Alabama also argued that 1) the
court's action would require allocations of funds and other
fiscal decisions which

we~e

the province of the Alabama

Legislature and not the courts and 2) the real purpose of
mental health facilities was to relieve friends and family
of their custodial duties in attempting to care for the
mentally deficient, and accordingly custodial care was all
. d • 304
th a t was require
303
Comment: Wyatt v. Stickney and the Right of Civilly
Committed Mental Patients to Adequate Treatment, Harvard
Law Review, 1973, 86, 1282, 1296.
304
Wyatt v. Aderholt, supra.
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The court in Wyatt held, however, that the controversy
was proper for the courts.

A judge is not required to choose

one treatment over another,

and the court will simply review

the treatment offered to assure that a number of habilitation
alternatives are available.

Treatment is required by the

U.S. Constitution and not mere custodial care, so, having
undertaken to

pro~ide

facilities for the mentally deficient

and permitting their involuntary connnitment to these facilities, the state must allocate sufficient funds to provide
adequate habilitation. 305
SUMMARY
There are several legal bases for treatment or habili tation of the mentally retarded--constitutional, statutory
and connnon law tort and contract theories.

No single theory

has become dominant, and further litigation can be expected.
There is, however, a legal right to treatment which has been
recognized by many courts, and those courts have determined
305

offer,c.w., Field Report, Psychology Today, 1974,
61. (The author reviews Wyatt and notes that for some
attorneys Wyatt and suits of its type are a stop gap measure
with the ultimate goal closure of the institutions. Those
attorneys and mental health professionals believe that
adequate treatment within a large iastitution is by definition impossible. As a result many are proposing utilization
of connnunity based facilities.)
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that the issue of whether or not treatment is adequate is
appropriate for judicial review.

Perhaps even more signif-

icant than judicial opinions is legislation, especially the
Developmentally Disabled Assistance and Bill of Rights Act.
Section 113 of the act requires that each state receiving
formula grants for developmental disabilities' services
must have an independent system for the protection and
advocacy of the rights of persons receiving such aid by
October 1, 1977.

Implementation of these systems of

advocacy may do much to secure the mentally retarded's right
to treatment.
It has been suggested that the most effective method
of providing treatment is through legislation rather than
305
. 1 ation
.
.
. .
.
Legis
is
no t
1 1t1gat1on.

sub.Ject to t h e wh'ims o f

individual judges and is not controlled by the particular
facts before the court.

This kind of limitation is well

illustrated by the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Donaldson306 in which the court restricted its holding to the rights
of an individual who was not dangerous to himself and others
and who had friends and relatives willing to provide for his
care simply because that was the posture of the case before
the court and it made its holding as restrictive as possible.
305

.
Re h a b"l'
1 1tat1on
Researc h and Training Center in
Mental Retardation, Monograph 94, Eugene, Oregon: University
of Oregon, 1976.
306

Donaldson v. O'Connor, supra.
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It may be argued that since courts have recognized that there
is a right to treatment and that the courts are competent
and constitutionally authorized to evaluate the treatment
given, it is now incumbent upon legislators to enact
legislation providing for the right to treatment with some
specificity.

Additionally, almost all of the cases

have concerned mentally retarded patients in state facilities.
This has occurred because many of the legal bases discussed
earlier require some type of state action.

Legislatures

need not be so restricted and may enact legislation securing
treatment for noninstitutionalized mentally retarded persons
who have or may suffer a deprivation of liberty.
Whether these rights are secured by judicial opinion
or legislation there is a need for an interdisciplinary
approach with psychologists providing appropriate guidelines.
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CHAPTER V
CONCLUSION

Psychologists have generally accepted the normalization principle and the court in wyatt v. Stickney has issued
orders in an attempt to implement it in an institutional
setting.

There is no judicial opinion of national impact,

such as a decision by the U.S. Supreme Court, accepting the
normalization principle.

In fact, the Supreme Court refused

to hold either that the mentally retarded do have a constitutional right to treatment or that they do not.

This chapter

will examine the present legal provisions for treatment and
the countervailing pressures in the push toward deinstitutionalization and least restrictive alternative.

The prospect

of legislation as a more feasible approach for securing
effective treatment for the mentally .retarded is discussed
and recommendations are made.
LEGAL PROVISIONS IN OREGON

By statute Oregon has established state hospitals for
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treatment of the mentally ill,

307

and for the

training" of the mentally deficient. 308
ing to the mentally

11

care and

The statutes relat-

ill do not specify the kind of treat-

ment to be provided but only that the person may be discharged when he is no longer mentally ill.309

The mentally

ill person who has been conunitted does have a right l} to
have a written treatment plan, 2) to be kept current with
his progress, and 3) to have some protection from the use of
potentially unusual or hazardous procedures and mechanical
restraints as discussed in Chapter

rv. 310

not insured by statute for the retarded.
ed person

These rights are
The mentally retard-

whether involuntarily conunitted or voluntarily

admitted will only be discharged when he is no longer a "fit
subject for institutionalization 11 • 31 1

The statute is unclear,

as is the legislative history of the kind and quality of
treatment to be provided, if any, to the patients.
307

ORS 426.010.

3080RS 427.010.
3090RS 426.300.
3100RS 426.385.
3110RS 427.250.

An
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indication of the kind of treatment the legislature deems
adequate may be found in the delineation of services which,
by statute, are to be provided out-patients at the state
facilities.

These services include diagnostic services,
312
advice and other "necessary 11 services.
What constitutes
necessary services is unclear.
it is mere custodial care.

Arguments could be made that

A review of psychological lit-

erature, would indicate that necessary services means all
tested methods of achieving normalization.

Legislative

amendment or judicial clarification are required.
Oregon statutes require special education for handicapped children in addition to regular classes--special
classes, special schools, special services, home instruction
or hospital instruction. 313

Handicapped children include

mentally retarded children under age 21. 3 1 4
The standards for determining adequacy of instruction
are not specified in the statutes.

Oregon statutes provide

for a State Advisory Councel for Handicapped Children, composed of parents and educators of handicapped children, which
advises the Superintendent

of

Public Instruction and the State

Board of Education on the sprcial education programs.
I

3120RS 427.106.
313
ORS 343. 035 (3), 221.
314
ORS 343.035(2).
3150RS 343.287.

315
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Administrative agency regulations promulgated by the
Oregon Department of Education provide for hearing procedures
to be followed prior to a child's placement in a different
educational program.

The hearing procedures require notice,

and afford the parents the right to be represented by an
attorney, and to present testimony at the hearing.

There

are also administrative regulations concerning the minimum
education standards for state institutions serving the mentally retarded. 316
Oregon statutes and regulations provide for care,
training and education but are far from outlining a plan for
habilitation such as the following proscribed in Wyatt:
1. Residents shall have a right to habilitation, including medical treatment, education and care, suited
to their needs regardless of age, degree of retardation
or handicapping condition.
2. Each resident has a right to a habilitation program
which will maximize his human abilities and enhance his
ability to cope with his environment. The institution
shall recognize that each resident, regardless of ability
or status, is entitled to develop and realize his fullest
potential. The institution shall implement the principle of normalization so that each resident may live
as normally as possible.

* * *

3.c. Residents shall have a right to the least
restrictive conditions necessary to achieve the
pruposes of habilitation. To this end, the institution shall make every attempt to move residents
316
OAR 581-15-110.
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from (1) more to less structured living; (2) larger
to smaller facilities1 (3) larger to smaller living
units; (4) group to individual residence: {5) segregated from the community to integrated into t~I
7
community; (6) dependent to independent living.
DEINSTITUTIONAL!ZATION
As a result of decisions such as Wyatt and various
articles by mental health professionals there is an increasing emphasis toward deinstitutionalization.

Wyatt and cases

like it have set high standards requiring individualized
treatment, reasonable staff/patient ratios and certain minimal living conditions.

The high cost and responsibility of

maintaining the institutions has led many states to establish
group homes in community settings.

Also based upon the prin-

ciple of normalization and deinstitutionalization mental
health professionals have advocated use of group homes in the
community.318 Four problems may be seen as possible impediments
317
318

wyatt v. Stickney, supra, 396.

Courts, which are given through statutes or judicial
opinions alternatives to commitment, are often unaware of the
alternative kinds of placement available. Mental health professionals must act as promoters for community care and assure that explorations for alternatives actually occur. It
has also been suggested that courts employ a staff member to
advise them of the various alternatives available. Alternative To Mental Hospital Treatment, Hospital and Community
Psychiatry, 1976, 27(4), 186, 187. The Multnomah County Public
Defender's Office has an alternative worker assigned to every
attorney representing mentally ill or retarded clients.
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in the move toward deinstitutionalization: 1) there is oonsiderable pressure from lobbyists for labor unions and state
employees to keep the institutions operating; 3 19

2} the

conununity may not welcome mentally retarded into the neighborhood to live in a group home and may enact zoning laws to
restrict occupancy; 3) as discussed in Chapter I, the mentally
retarded are a very diverse group and there may be more opportunity to work with and be instructed with other mentally
retarded persons with comparable development and intelligence
in a large institution rather than a smaller group home; 320
and 4) funding affects what theory is implemented or legislation applied.
Construction of large mental health facilities can mean
more jobs for workers.

Group homes

would also, but unions

tend to favor construction on large projects, 3 21 and
state employees are reluctant to lose jobs at the institutions.
319

In California where the state had begun to close
institutions in favor of group homes, lobbyists forced the
state to reverse itself and institutions are no longer being
closed.
320
Tarjan,G., Wright,s.w., Eyman,R,K. & Kenan,c.v.,
Natural History of Mental Retardation; Some Aspects of
Epidimiolo9y, American Journal of Mental Deficiency. 1973,
77(4), 369, 373,
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Blatt,B., The Executive,in Changing Patterns in
Residential Services for the Mental! Retarded(Rev.ed.) Kugel,
R.B. & S earer,A. ed. Washiwgton,D.C.: President's Conunittee
on Mental Retardation., 1976.
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As noted in Chapter IV, the action in Wyatt V. · Stickney was
originally begun by a group of disgruntled state employees.
Interestingly, as a part of its judgment the court directed
the employment of 300 additional state employed staff
workers. 322

As a result, legislators and elected judges have

even more constituents

who may be seeking maintenance of the

institution because of the jobs it affords.
The fact that a small residential care facility is
moving into the community is in keeping with the theories of
normalization and least restrictive alternative treatment, but
may not be in keeping with what some of the residents believe
is appropriate for their community.

Traditionally urban com-

munities have zoning ordinances which only permit one or possibly two family dwellings in a neighborhood and those families
323
must be related.
As a result local governments and some
courts have compared a family care home for the mentally retarded to a boarding house and required that it be located in

. 1 zone. 324
a commercia

Most zoning ordinances also allow for

322
Gilhoal,T.K., The Use:s of Courts and of Lawyers, in
Changing Patterns, supra.
323

Chandler,J.A. & Ross,s.,Jr., Zoning Restrictions and
the R;lght To Live in the community, in The Mentally Retarded
Citizen and the Law, supra.

324
Id.
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variances from the comprehensive zoning plan or conditional
use permits to permit construction or occupancy in an otherwise inappropriate zone if it is compatible with existing use.
However because of the possibly harmful effect on land values,
such variances are difficult to obtain.
It has been suggested that the zoning problem might be
alleviated by requiring the owner to first obtain a license to
operate a group home.

The granting of the license might de-

pend on such factors as a "planned treatment" program, adequate
supervision, and a program to obtain community acceptance. 325
This kind of legislation, or recognition that "family" may
entail more than relatives, together with a program of community education and awareness could help alleviate this zoning problem.
The availability of funds determines the kind of program
available.

This paper· has not presented any kind of economic

cost analysis comparing the cost of operating a group home
with a large institution. 326
4, Governor Wallace in Wyatt

However, as discussed in Chapter

v.

Stickney argued that the State

325
Kressel,L. 1 The Coi:nmunity Residence Movement: La.nd
Use Conflicts and Planning Imperatives, New York University
Review of Law and Social Chan;l'e, 1975, V(2), 137.
326
See Boggs,E.M.; Quality Control of Coi:nmunity Services,
in Mentally Retarded Citizen and the Law, supra.
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of Alabama could not afford the kind of treatment that the
experts testified was required.
the adequacy of funding
adequate treatment.

The court in Wyatt held that

was no excuse

for failing to provide

Also the availability of federal funds

under the Developmentally Disabled Assistance and Bill of
Rights Act may be of considerable impact in this area as
discussed in Chapter IV.
LEAST RESTRICTIVE ALTERNATIVES
Whether in large institutions or in group homes there
is a growing consensus that the mentally retarded are entitled to habilitation in the least restrictive setting , however the consensus has thus far been restricted to the institutionalized mentally retarded.

As pointed out in Chapter I,

a large number of mentally retarded are not institutionalized;
but, as discussed in Chapter III, their liberty has been
restricted by such legal devices as guardianship.

It has

been suggested in the area of guardianship that under the
least restrictive alternative a guardian should only be
appointed for those specific things that the mentally retarded
cannot do for himself.

327

327
Gearheart & Litton, supra.
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Perhaps the least restrictive alternative could be
carried an additional step to require that the guardian receive assistance in planning the education and activities of
his mentally retarded ward utilizing the principles of normalization.

Neither the legislatures nor the courts have

taken any strong action to expand the theories of normalization and least restrictive alternative to the noninstitutionalzied mentally retarded.
LITIGATION VS. LEGISLATION
Both the legislatures and the courts have been active
in law for the mentally retarded, especially the institutionalized.

As stated earlier, the 1960's era was one of legis-

lation while the 1970's has been one of litigation.

But

litigation has recently been criticized for the following
reasons: 1) it is expensive to hire the attorneys and expert
witnesses and to conduct a thorough investigation; 2) a final
determination by a judge could take two to three years; 3)
the decision is usually restricted to the facts before the
court and not a universal rule such as the legislature might
enact; 4) the mentally retardeds' opposi tion--us.ually the
state--has appeared in litigated cases with more frequency
and better financing, and thus might be better prepared:
and 5) the court may be lacking resources and expertise to
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carry out any treatment plan it might impose. 328
Test case litigation has been a catalyst in generating
heightened public concern for the mentally retarded, but it
appears that we are now returning to an era of legislation.
Legislatures can establish uniform standards, have more staff
and finances to investigate without stifling appropriate
experimentation, and can appropriate the funds to carry out
329
. 1 ation.
.
1 egis
It has been suggested that all three branches of
.
330
government working together would be effective.
The
legislatures could establish strict guidelines for administrators and provide them with necessary finances.

The ad-

ministrators could run the institutions, and the courts
328 Krawles,R., Litigation vs. Legislation in The Right
to Treatment/Habi1itation for Mentally Retarded Persons: A
Review and Proposal, Rehabilitation, Research and Training
Center in Mental Retardation, Eugene, Oregon, 1976; Gilhoal,
T.K., The Uses of Courts and of Lawyers, in Kugel,R.B. &
SFiearer ,A. (eds.) Changing Patterns in Residential Services
for the Mentally Retarded (rev.ed.). Washington,D.C.: President's Committee on Mental Retardation, 1976. Gilhoal
suggests that groups advocating the rights of the mentally
retarded organize themsleves into litigation groups so that
they can become repetitive litigants as are insurance
companies, prosecuting attorneys and collection agencies.
This would give the mentally retarded more expertise in
litigating and more opportunity to see that the court's orders
were carried out.
329
Kram.bs, supra.
33Q Johnson,R.H. & Wood,J.J.,Sr., Jud.1c1al,
.
. 1
.
Legis
ative,
and Administrative Competence in Setting Institutional Standards, in The Mentally Retarded Citizen and the Law, supra.
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could ensure that the legislative and administrative responsibilities have been satisfied.

All branches of government work
tect the consumer.

cooperatively to pro-

We are living in an age of consumerism

and even the mentally retarded citizen can be seen as a consumer of services.

The services are provided by the institu-

tions331 and by private mental health professionals as well.
If the mentally retarded are seen as consumers they may be
offered the appropriate protection afforded consumers.

As

Discussed in Chapters III and IV, the mentally retarded person may be able to contract for services with the institution
and with mental health professionals.

Utilization of a con-

tract not only generates expectancy but also may give the
mentally retarded a cause of action against the institution
or the private person when the services are not provided.
The law and psychology are beginning to approach
their mutual concerns for the mentally retarded with some
sense of cooperation and unity of purpose.

Current concepts

and applications discussed in Chapter II have implications
for minimum treatment guidelines formulated by legislatures
33lWyatt v. Stickney~supra. Dr. Phillis Roos, Executive
Director for the National Association for Retarded Children
in his testimony repeatedly referred to the mentally retarded
as the consumers of the services offered. See also Schwitzgebel,R.K., The Right -to Treatment for the Mentally Disabled:
The Need for Realistic Standards and Objective Criteria,
Harvard Civil Rights-civil Liberties Law Review, 1973, ~, 513.
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or by the courts.

For example, the fact that behavior mod-

ification can assist the mentally retarded person achieve
normalization illustrates a need for more staffing in order
to achieve one to one patient/staff ratios necessary in some
behavioral therapy.

However, in utilizing behavioral therapy

care must be taken that the treatment is performed legally
and ethically.

As discussed in Chapter III, Oregon patients

have some rights concerning use of unusual or possibly harmful procedures as a part of their treatment process. Conseguently these legal restrictions on what may be done to
treat the mentally retarded must be considered.33 2

In

addition to legal constraints on utilizing certain forms of
treatment there are certain ethical constraints such as
informed consent of the treatment to be given.

The consent

should be based on an understanding of the procedure,
totally voluntary and given by a competent person. 333
332
There is growing literature on what has been
described as the right to avoid treatment. It is primarily
concerned with shock tr~atments, physical deprivation, and
forms of punishment as F-herapies for altering behavior.
This paper does not add~ess this issue. The interested
reader should see Sympotsium: Behavior Control, Arizona
Law Review, 1975, 25, 1.
333
Guidelines for the Use of Behavior Procedures in
M.R. Research. Arlington, Texas: National Association for
Retarded Citizens, 1976.
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RECOMMENDATIONS

In light of the conclusions reached, the

followi,n9

are suggested activities for assisting the mentally retarded
achieve habilitation:
1)

More emphasis on research of the retarded i.n the

community, on community living versus institutionalization,
and on special education versus integrated, mainstreamed
classes.
2)

Development of national standards incorporating

ideological principles of normalization, a developmental
approach to services, consumer participation and protection
of the mentally retarded person's lega1 and human rights.
As discussed in Chapter I, organizations such as the National
Association for Retarded Children and the American Association
on Mental Deficiency have devised various standards throughout
their existence and may be able to do so in this case.
Additionally, Judge Johnson in Wyatt adopted specific minimal
treatment standards for the mentally retarded which have been
widely followed.
3)

Re-evaluation and.amendment of present laws dealing

with the retarded concerning personal and community rights
as outlined in Chapter III.

For instance, elimination of

special laws on contract, marriage, sterilization or adoption -- in keeping with the principle of normalization could
be effected.

148
4)

Adoption of legislation giving the mentally retard-

ed a statutory right to adequate treatment in light . of current
knowledge to meet his or her needs; provision in the statute
for creation of a conmlittee to develop and revise minimum
standards and to preside over a patient's challenges to the
treatment given; establishment of a treatment monitoring
team which will periodically review each patient's treatment
plan to evaluate adequacy; and establishment of a manual
which sets forth required minimum treatment levels.
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